zondag 23 juni 2019

Analysis: How well have climate models projected global warming?






 
5 October 2017  17:00

Analysis: How well have climate models projected global warming?


ZEKE HAUSFATHER

05.10.2017 | 5:00pm
Scientists have been making projections of future global warming using climate models of increasing complexity for the past four decades.
These models, driven by atmospheric physics and biogeochemistry, play an important role in our understanding of the Earth’s climate and how it will likely change in the future.
Carbon Brief has collected prominent climate model projections since 1973 to see how well they project both past and future global temperatures, as shown in the animation below. (Click the play button to start.)

While some models projected less warming than we’ve experienced and some projected more, all showed surface temperature increases between 1970 and 2016 that were not too far off from what actually occurred, particularly when differences in assumed future emissions are taken into account.

How have past climate models fared?

While climate model projections of the past benefit from knowledge of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, volcanic eruptions and other radiative forcingsaffecting the Earth’s climate, casting forward into the future is understandably more uncertain. Climate models can be evaluated both on their ability to hindcast past temperatures and forecast future ones.
Hindcasts – testing models against past temperatures – are useful because they can control for radiative forcings. Forecasts are useful because models cannot be implicitly tuned to be similar to observations. Climate models are not fit to historical temperatures, but modellers do have some knowledge of observations that can inform their choice of model parameterisations, such as cloud physics and aerosol effects.
In the examples below, climate model projections published between 1973 and 2013 are compared with observed temperatures from five different organizations. The models used in the projections vary in complexity, from simple energy balance models to fully-coupled Earth System Models.
(Note, these model/observation comparisons use a baseline period of 1970-1990 to align observations and models during the early years of the analysis, which shows how temperatures have evolved over time more clearly.)

Sawyer, 1973

One of the first projections of future warming came from John Sawyer at the UK’s Met Office in 1973. In a paper published in Nature in 1973, he hypothesised that the world would warm 0.6C between 1969 and 2000, and that atmospheric CO2 would increase by 25%. Sawyer argued for a climate sensitivity – how much long-term warming will occur per doubling of atmospheric CO2 levels – of 2.4C, which is not too far off the best estimate of 3C used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) today.
Unlike the other projections examined in this article, Sawyer did not provide an estimated warming for each year, just an expected 2000 value. His warming estimate of 0.6C was nearly spot on – the observed warming over that period was between 0.51C and 0.56C. He overestimated the year 2000’s atmospheric CO2 concentrations, however, assuming that they would be 375-400ppm – compared to the actual value of 370ppm.

Broecker, 1975

The first available projection of future temperatures due to global warming appeared in an article in Science in 1975 published by Columbia University scientist Prof Wally Broecker. Broecker used a simple energy balance model to estimate what would happen to the Earth’s temperature if atmospheric CO2 continued to increase rapidly after 1975. Broecker’s projected warming was reasonably close to observations for a few decades, but recently has been considerably higher.
This is mostly due to Broecker overestimating how CO2 emissions and atmospheric concentrations would increase after his article was published. He was fairly accurate up to 2000, predicting 373ppm of CO2 – compared to actual Mauna Loa observations of 370ppm. In 2016, however, he estimated that CO2 would be 424ppm, whereas only 404 pm has been observed.
Broecker also did not take other greenhouse gases into account in his model. However, as the warming impact from methanenitrous oxide and halocarbons has been largely cancelled out by the overall cooling influence of aerosols since 1970, this does not make that large a difference (though estimates of aerosol forcings have large uncertainties).
As with Sawyer, Broecker used an equilibrium climate sensitivity of 2.4C per doubling of CO2. Broecker assumed that the Earth instantly warms up to match atmospheric CO2, while modern models account for the lag between how quickly the atmosphere and oceans warm up. (The slower heat uptake by the oceans is often referred to as the “thermal inertia” of the climate system.)
You can see his projection (black line) compared to observed temperature rise (coloured lines) in the chart below.
Projected warming from Broecker 1975 (thick black line) compared to observational temperature records from NASANOAAHadCRUTCowtan and Way, and Berkeley Earth (thin colored lines) from 1970 to 2020. Baseline period of 1970-1990. Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
Broecker made his projection at a time when scientists widely thought that the observations showed a modest cooling of the Earth. He began his article by presciently stating that “a strong case can be made that the present cooling trend will, within a decade or so, give way to a pronounced warming induced by carbon dioxide”.

Hansen et al, 1981

NASA’s Dr James Hansen and colleagues published a paper in 1981 that also used a simple energy balance model to project future warming, but accounted for thermal inertia due to ocean heat uptake. They assumed a climate sensitivity of 2.8C per doubling CO2, but also looked at a range of 1.4-5.6C per doubling.
Projected warming from Hansen et al 1981 (fast growth–thick black line–and slow growth–thin grey line). Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
Hansen and colleagues presented a number of different scenarios, varying future emissions and climate sensitivity. In the chart above, you can see both the “fast-growth” scenario (thick black line), where CO2 emissions increase by 4% annually after 1981, and a slow-growth scenario where emissions increase by 2% annually (thin grey line). The fast-growth scenario somewhat overestimates current emissions, but when combined with a slightly lower climate sensitivity it provides an estimate of early-2000s warming close to observed values.
The overall rate of warming between 1970 and 2016 projected by Hansen et al in 1981 in the fast-growth scenario has been about 20% lower than observations.

Hansen et al, 1988

The paper published by Hansen and colleagues in 1988 represented one of the first modern climate models. It divided the world into discrete grid cells of eight degrees latitude by 10 degrees longitude, with nine vertical layers of the atmosphere. It included aerosols, various greenhouse gases in addition to CO2, and basic cloud dynamics.
Hansen et al presented three different scenarios associated with different future greenhouse gas emissions. Scenario B is shown in the chart below as a thick black line, while scenarios A and C are shown by thin grey lines. Scenario A had exponential growth in emissions, with CO2 and other GHG concentrations considerably higher than today.
Projected warming from Hansen et al 1988 (scenario B–thick black line–and scenarios A and C–thin solid and dashed grey lines). Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
Scenario B assumed a gradual slowdown in CO2 emissions, but had concentrations of 401ppm in 2016 that were pretty close to the 404ppm observed. However, scenario B assumed the continued growth of emissions of various halocarbons that are powerful greenhouse gases, but were subsequently restricted under the Montreal Protocol of 1987. Scenario C had emissions going to near-zero after the year 2000.
Of the three, scenario B was closest to actual radiative forcing, though still about 10% too high. Hansen et al also used a model with a climate sensitivity of 4.2C per doubling CO2 – on the high end of most modern climate models. Due to the combination of these factors, scenario B projected a rate of warming between 1970 and 2016 that was approximately 30% higher than what has been observed.

IPCC First Assessment Report, 1990

The IPCC’s First Assessment Report (FAR) in 1990 featured relatively simple energy balance/upwelling diffusion ocean models to estimate changes in global air temperatures. Their featured business-as-usual (BAU) scenario assumed rapid growth of atmospheric CO2, reaching 418ppm CO2 in 2016, compared to 404ppm in observations. The FAR also assumed continued growth of atmospheric halocarbon concentrations much faster than has actually occurred.
The FAR gave a best estimate of climate sensitivity as 2.5C warming for doubled CO2, with a range of 1.5-4.5C. These estimates are applied to the BAU scenario in the figure below, with the thick black line representing the best estimate and the thin dashed black lines representing the high and low end of the climate sensitivity range.
Projected warming from the IPCC First Assessment Report (mean projection–thick black line, with upper and lower bounds shown by thin dotted black lines). Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
Despite a best estimate of climate sensitivity a tad lower than the 3C used today, the FAR overestimated the rate of warming between 1970 and 2016 by around 17% in their BAU scenario, showing 1C warming over that period vs 0.85C observed. This is mostly due to the projection of much higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations than has actually occurred.

IPCC Second Assessment Report, 1995

The IPCC’s Second Assessment Report (SAR) only published readily-available projections from 1990 onward. They used a climate sensitivity of 2.5C, with a range of 1.5-4.5C. Their mid-range emissions scenario, “IS92a”, projected CO2 levels of 405ppm in 2016, nearly identical to observed concentrations. SAR also included much better treatment of anthropogenic aerosols, which have a cooling effect on the climate.

Projected warming from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (mean projection–thick black line, with upper and lower bounds shown by thin dotted black lines). Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
As you can see in the chart above, SAR’s projections ended up being notably lower than observations, warming about 28% more slowly over the period from 1990 to 2016. This was likely due to a combination of two factors: a lower climate sensitivity than found in modern estimates (2.5C vs. 3C) and an overestimate of the radiative forcing of CO2(4.37 watts per square meter versus 3.7 used in the subsequent IPCC report and still used today).

IPCC Third Assessment Report, 2001

The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) relied on atmosphere-ocean general circulation models (GCMs) from seven different modeling groups. They also introduced a new set of socioeconomic emission scenarios, called SRES, which included four different future emission trajectories.
Here, Carbon Brief examines the A2 scenario, though all have fairly similar emissions and warming trajectories up to 2020. The A2 scenario projected a 2016 atmospheric CO2 concentration of 406 ppm, nearly the same as what was observed. The SRES scenarios were from 2000 onward, with models prior to the year 2000 using estimated historical forcings. The dashed grey line in the figure above shows the point at which models transition from using observed emissions and concentrations to projected future ones.
Projected warming from the IPCC Third Assessment Report (mean projection–thick black line, with upper and lower bounds shown by thin dotted black lines). Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
TAR’s headline projection used a simple climate model that was configured to match the average outputs of seven more sophisticated GCMs, as no specific multimodel average was published in TAR and data for individual model runs are not readily available. It has a climate sensitivity of 2.8C per doubling CO2, with a range of 1.5-4.5C. As shown in the chart above, the rate of warming between 1970 and 2016 in the TAR was about 14% lower than what has actually been observed.

IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 2007

The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) featured models with significantly improved atmospheric dynamics and model resolution. It made greater use of Earth System Models – which incorporate the biogeochemistry of carbon cycles – as well as improved simulations of land surface and ice processes.
AR4 used the same SRES scenarios as the TAR, with historical emissions and atmospheric concentrations up to the year 2000 and projections thereafter. Models used in AR4 had a mean climate sensitivity of 3.26C, with a range of 2.1C to 4.4C.
Projected warming from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (mean projection–thick black line, two-sigma upper and lower bounds shown by thin dotted black lines). Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
The figure above shows model runs for the A1B scenario (which is the only scenario with model runs readily available, though its 2016 CO2 concentrations are nearly identical to those of the A2 scenario). AR4 projections between 1970 and 2016 show warming quite close to observations, only 8% higher.

IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, 2013

The most recent IPCC report – the Fifth Assessment (AR5) – featured additional refinements on climate models, as well as a modest reduction in future model uncertainty compared to AR4. The climate models in the latest IPCC report were part of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 5 (CMIP5), where dozens of different modeling groups all around the world ran climate models using the same set of inputs and scenarios.
Projected warming from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (mean projection–thick black line, two-sigma upper and lower bounds shown by thin dotted black lines). Dashed black line shows blended model fields. Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
AR5 introduced a new set of future greenhouse gas concentration scenarios, known as the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). These have future projections from 2006 onwards, with historical data prior to 2006. The grey dashed line in the figure above shows where models transition from using observed forcings to projected future forcings.
Comparing these models with observations can be a somewhat tricky exercise. The most often used fields from climate models are global surface air temperatures. However, observed temperatures come from surface air temperatures over land and sea surface temperatures over the ocean.
To account for this, more recently, researchers have created blended model fields, which include sea surface temperatures over the oceans and surface air temperatures over land, in order to match what is actually measured in the observations. These blended fields, shown by the dashed line in the figure above, show slightly less warming than global surface air temperatures, as models have the air over the ocean warming faster than sea surface temperatures in recent years.
Global surface air temperatures in CMIP5 models have warmed about 16% faster than observations since 1970. About 40% of this difference is due to air temperatures over the ocean warming faster than sea surface temperatures in the models; blended model fields only show warming 9% faster than observations.
recent paper in Nature by Iselin Medhaug and colleagues suggests that the remainder of the divergence can be accounted for by a combination of short-term natural variability (mainly in the Pacific Ocean), small volcanoes and lower-than-expected solar output that was not included in models in their post-2005 projections.
Below is a summary of all the models Carbon Brief has looked at. The table below shows the difference in the rate of warming between each model or set of models and NASA’stemperature observations. All the observational temperature records are fairly similar, but NASA’s is among the group that includes more complete global coverage in recent years and is thus more directly comparable to climate model data.
* SAR trend differences are calculated over the period from 1990-2016, as estimates prior to 1990 are not readily available.
# Differences in parenthesis based on blended model land/ocean fields

Conclusion

Climate models published since 1973 have generally been quite skillful in projecting future warming. While some were too low and some too high, they all show outcomes reasonably close to what has actually occurred, especially when discrepancies between predicted and actual CO2 concentrations and other climate forcings are taken into account.
Models are far from perfect and will continue to be improved over time. They also show a fairly large range of future warming that cannot easily be narrowed using just the changes in climate that we have observed.
Nevertheless, the close match between projected and observed warming since 1970 suggests that estimates of future warming may prove similarly accurate.

Methodological note

Environmental scientist Dana Nuccitelli helpfully provided a list of past model/observation comparisons, available here. The PlotDigitizer software was used to obtain values from older figures when data was not otherwise available. CMIP3 and CMIP5 model data was obtained from KNMI Climate Explorer.
 

zaterdag 22 juni 2019

Video reveals Steve Bannon links to Boris Johnson








Video reveals Steve Bannon links to Boris Johnson

Far-right activist claimed he helped with Boris Johnson’s resignation speech as foreign secretary


Footage shot by US film-maker Alison Klayman of Steve Bannon speaking at a London hotel on 16 July 2018 about helping Boris Johnson with his Leave speech. Footage shot by US film-maker Alison Klayman of Steve Bannon speaking at a London hotel on 16 July 2018 about helping Boris Johnson with his Leave speech. Photograph: Alison Klayma



hares


Sat 22 Jun 2019 

New evidence suggesting close links between Boris Johnson and Donald Trump’s controversial former campaign manager Steve Bannon can be revealed today, calling into question the former foreign secretary’s previous denials of an association with the influential far-right activist.
Video evidence obtained by the Observer shows Bannon, who helped mastermind Trump’s successful bid for the presidency but was later exiled from the White House, talking about his relationship and contacts with Johnson, and how he helped him craft the first speech after his resignation as foreign secretary, in which Johnson tore into Theresa May’s Brexit strategy.
The revelations will pile new pressure on Johnson after the Guardianreported that police had been called to the flat he shares with his partner, Carrie Symonds, in the early hours of Friday morning after neighbours heard a loud altercation involving screaming, shouting and banging.
Reports of Johnson and Bannon’s relationship were first published last summer. When asked about it at the time, Johnson said: “As for the so-called association with Steve Bannon, I’m afraid this is a lefty delusion whose spores continue to breed in the Twittersphere.”
He said he had met Bannon in his role as foreign secretary and found the accusation that he was ‘with Bannon’ to be ‘perplexing’.
The unpublished footage was shot in July last year by Alison Klayman, an American film-maker who followed Bannon over many months for a new documentary called The Brink. It sets out Bannon’s account of how the two had been in close contact particularly around the time of Johnson’s resignation from the May government.
The clips were shot in the week Johnson resigned over Brexit, when Bannon was in London meeting leaders of the European far right, including Nigel Farage. They are not included in the final film, which is being released in July, but Klayman passed the footage to the Observer.
The first clip shows Bannon reading a front page story in the Daily Telegraphabout Johnson’s resignation speech with the headline ‘Let’s Make Britain Great Again’. He says: “Today we are going to see if Boris Johnson tries to overthrow the British government. He’s going to give a speech in the Commons.”
Bannon then says: “I’ve been talking to him all weekend about this speech. We went back and forth over the text.”
Klayman asks him if they’ve been speaking on the phone and he says: “Talked to him initially over the phone then it’s just easier to go back and forth on text. It’s just easier. I’ve been telling him one of my recommendations is that he gave one of the most important political speeches of 2016. Was his closing speech, a three-to-five-minute speech in June 2016, his closing argument on national TV for the Leave campaign ... And it was magnificent.
“And all I was telling him all weekend was just to incorporate those themes. Those same themes. Basically, he was saying that June 23 was independence day for Great Britain. Their independence day being like our July 4.”
Bannon adds: “This is the tee up, right. He’s back.”
He then describes Johnson’s career, saying: “He wrote a really great book on Churchill. That’s one of the things I told him over the weekend.”
Bannon says he got to know Johnson after the US presidential election when he was working as Donald Trump’s chief strategist. “Right after we won, Boris flew over. Because their victory was as unexpected as ours. I got to know him quite well in the transition period,” he said.
The video is bound to raise further questions about Johnson’s openness and the extent to which he has relied on Bannon for advice at key stages in his bid for Downing Street. Bannon has described the far-right activist Stephen Yaxley-Lennon – known as Tommy Robinson – as the “backbone” of Britain.
A spokesman for Johnson said: “Any suggestion that Boris is colluding with or taking advice from Mr Bannon or Nigel Farage is totally preposterous to the point of conspiracy.”
Bannon, who has previously said that he believed Johnson had “the potential to make a great prime minister”, declined to comment further. Alison Klayman, the film-maker, said that Bannon had been “unequivocal” about his communications with Johnson. She also said that Bannon had met Farage, a close associate, several times during the same visit.
The clips also raise further questions about Bannon’s role in the EU referendum. Bannon, a former vice-president at the data firm Cambridge Analytica, had launched a British version of the rightwing news site Breitbart to support Ukip and Farage, and had been its executive chairman during the referendum. Breitbart has been funded by Robert Mercer, the American hedge fund billionaire, who partly owned Cambridge Analytica, and was also the single biggest donor to Donald Trump’s campaign.
On the day that article 50 was triggered, Nigel Farage was filmed with a pint of beer thanking them both. “Well done Bannon. Well done Breitbart. You helped with this. Hugely,” he said.Other clips shot by Klayman show Bannon talking about the close contact between Breitbart’s editors and the Leave campaigns, including Johnson’s Vote Leave campaign. In one, he says: “Here we kind of trained folks that it takes years to build stuff and get it operating and that’s what I think we proved in Brexit with all the work we did in Breitbart London.”
At a speech in South Carolina last year, Bannon previously said that Farage and Ukip were foundational to Trump’s success: “I said, ‘That’s a canary in a mine shaft. We have to get a group there that sets up and covers that every day like Breitbart covers politics here. Because by following Ukip, we’re going to understand the evolution of the Tea party.”

Under Attack II : Why I Resigned From Berlin’s Jewish Museum







Afbeeldingsresultaat voor logo haaretz




Why I Resigned From Berlin’s Jewish Museum

יוסי ברטל

Yossi Bartal


Jun 22, 2019 9:39 AM
The Jewish Museum by U.S. architect Daniel Liebeskind photographed in Berlin.
Markus Schreiber / ASSOCIATED PR

Last Monday, after guiding hundreds of different tour groups from Germany and around the world to various exhibitions, I submitted my resignation as a guide at the Jewish Museum of Berlin in protest against the crass political intervention by the German government and the State of Israel in the work of the museum.
The shameful firing of Peter Schäfer, among the most important scholars of Judaism in the world, in the wake of an aggressive campaign of “fake news” conducted by the Israeli Ambassador to Germany, Jeremy Issacharoff, and Josef Schuster, president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, made it clear that the German government is not interested any more in guarding the artistic and academic autonomy of the museum. And I am not interested in working for an institution that relinquishes its independence to serve the political interests of this or that state.
From the beginning, working as a Jewish guide at a Jewish museum where most of the staff and visitors are not Jews presented personal, political and pedagogical challenges. Thus questions of representation of the other and of speaking in their name have accompanied the work of the museum since its opening in 2003.
Is it appropriate for a German state museum to be called a Jewish museum at all, or must it be under the complete control of the official Jewish community (that itself only represents part of German Jewry)? Is a Jewish museum, in the absence of a similar institution addressing the Muslim community or other minority groups, responsible for providing space for the perspectives of children of migrants in Germany, many of whom live in neighborhoods nearby, and for conducting Jewish-Muslim dialogue?hould the museum function as a forum in which various opinions in the Jewish world can be heard, those touching on Israel as well? The answer of the head of the Jewish community, the Israeli ambassador and right-wing journalists, who for years have been running a toxic and untruthful campaign against museum staff, is an absolute no.
Thus a significant portion of the criticism of the museum suggests, or even declares openly, that the very fact that many of the staff members of the museum are not Jews negates their right to social activism that is not in keeping with the political preferences of the Jewish community’s representatives. This discourse reached the point of absurdity when Schuster, the leader of a community in which many members are not considered Jewish according to halakha, negated the museum’s right to call itself Jewish.
But we should not be confused by the legitimate criticism over the lack of Jewish representation in leading positions in Germany, because this criticism is raised only when non-Jews dare, even in the most sensitive way, to criticize policies of the Israeli government, or to come out against anti-Muslim racism. Proof of this may be seen in the Jewish community’s support for the 10 officials who have been nominated to fight anti-Semitism in the country: All 10 are non-Jews, and all 10 support the position that strong criticism of the occupation and of Israel’s religiously discriminatory character should be seen as an expression of anti-Semitism.
Not surprisingly, the extreme right-wing “Alternative for Germany” is the party that, by way of parliamentary questions, has been leading the campaign against the museum for the last year, as reported sympathetically by the house newspaper of Benjamin Netanyahu. Despite the Israeli Embassy’s contention that it is not in contact with members of the party, its opposition to museum activities is based on a fervent rejection of democratic discourse, and its absolute conflation of the interests of the Israeli government with those of world Jewry. Already in the past year, as part of an exhibition on Jerusalem and its significance to three religions, the museum was forced to cancel a lecture on the status of LGBTQ Palestinians in East Jerusalem because the Israeli ambassador suspected that the speaker, God help us, supports BDS.
Accusations of anti-Semitism, which carry enormous weight in Germany, lead more and more to censorship and self-censorship. Cultural institutions in Germany, which are supposed to provide a stage for critical positions, are threatened financially and politically if they even dare to host artists and musicians who at any time expressed support for non-violent resistance to the Israeli occupation. This policy of fear-mongering that Miri Regev leads in Israel is imported by supporters of Israel to Germany. Only in Germany, because of its great sensitivity to anti-Semitism and deep identification with Israel in the wake of the Shoah, are there politicians not only on the right but on the left as well who vehemently endorse the silencing of criticism of Israel.
The extreme right’s ascendance to power in places across the globe is based in great part on the constriction of democratic space and the intimidation and sanctioning of anyone who dares to oppose suppressive nationalist policies. The efforts of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the Foreign Ministry, in cooperation with Jewish and right-wing organizations around the world, to defame and slander anyone who refuses to join their campaign of incitement against human rights activists, has now led to the firing of an esteemed scholar, strictly because he chose to defend the rights of Israeli academics to oppose the designation of the BDS movement as an anti-Semitic movement.
Against this paranoid impulse toward purges, which to a great extent recalls the years of McCarthyism in the United States, one must take a clear public stance. If the firing of Peter Schäfer has a moral, it is that no matter how much approbation a person has received for his opposition to anti-Semitism and support for Israel, opposition to Netanyahu’s anti-democratic policies is enough to turn him into an enemy of the people and the nation.
If the German and Israeli governments are interested in the Jewish Museum representing only their narrow political interests and denying its staff members freedom of expression, I am not interested in having a part in it. So despite my deep respect for the museum’s staff, I proffered my resignation. I and many other Jews of my generation do not want or need a kashrut certificate from the State of Israel or the heads of the institutional Jewish community, nor, certainly, from the German government. Judaism, as a pluralistic and democratic world culture, will continue to exist after the racist, ultra-nationalist politics that has taken over many communal institutions passes from the world.
The writer has lived in Berlin for 13 years and works as a tour guide.