zaterdag 28 december 2013


Mrs. Peters’s Palestine



(Debunking) From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab–Jewish Conflict Over Palestine by Joan Peters

Harper and Row, 601 pp., $12.95 (paper)
For centuries the future of the place called Palestine was the subject of a bitter struggle. Even the name was controversial. Where the Arabs transformed the Roman name of Palestine into the Arabian name Filastin, the Jews insisted on the traditional Hebrew name Eretz Israel, “The Land of Israel.” Zealots of both sides continue to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the name used by the other side. In the early days of the British Mandate, for instance, the Arabs successfully convinced the British that even in Hebrew the name should be Palestina and not Eretz Israel. The British added the initials “El” to Palestina only over heavy Arab opposition. On the other hand, some Israeli educators of the 1950s wanted only a transliteration of the Hebrew name to appear in the textbooks that were used in the Arabic-speaking schools. Along with armed struggle, ideological and propagandistic warfare of this sort has proliferated in the Arab–Jewish conflict over Palestine.
One feature of this battle of words and of history writing has been the two contrasting mythologies that the Arabs and the Jews have developed to explain their situations. Like most myths these generally contain some element of plausibility, some grain of historical truth, which through terminological ambiguity is then twisted into a false and grotesque shape: The unfortunate thing about Joan Peters’s From Time Immemorial(1984) is that from a position of apparently great learning and research, she attempts to refute the Arab myths merely by substituting the Jewish myths for them. Although she claims to have uncovered facts that show the historical accuracy of the Jewish myths, there have appeared during the last year and a half, in addition to many favorable reviews, a number of articles that dispute her collection and interpretation of this data.1 I do not propose here to go over the ground that these criticisms have already covered. Rather, I shall discuss both sets of myths in the light of the political and social history of Palestine as it is currently understood.
The Arab side tried to prove that first of all the Jews were not a nation in the modern sense of the term and consequently did not require a state of their own. In the tradition of both Western liberal and doctrinaire socialist thinking, the Arabs argued that the Jews were only a religious community; that peoples could not return to their ancient homelands without turning the entire world upside down; and, most important, that Palestine had been settled since the seventh century AD by Arabs. Over the years many Arab ideologists even claimed that Arabs had occupied the land in pre-Biblical times because of the “Arab character” of Canaanites.
Zionism, the Arab argument continued, if it had any grain of historical justification at all, emerged only in a European setting. It came about as a reaction to Western Christian or secular and racist anti-Semitism, with which the Arabs had nothing to do; therefore, they should not be required to pay the costs of remedying it. In Arab and Islamic countries Jews suffered none of the terrible treatment that Western Jews had suffered. On the contrary, the Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular treated their religious and ethnic minorities with full equality and enabled both Christians and Jews to take part in public life, to rise to high positions of state, and, in recent times, to become full members of the modern and secular Arab nation living in its various states. The Jews living in the Arab and Muslim countries, moreover, did not take part in the Zionist movement. They even actively opposed it and did not want to emigrate to Israel. That most of them eventually did so the Arabs attribute to the machinations of Israel working with corrupt Arab rulers who were “stooges of imperialism.”
After the 1948 war Arab propaganda added an important new claim: since the Jews wanted Palestine empty of Arabs, they used the opportunity of the war to systematically expel the indigenous Arab population wherever they could do so. Some Arab writers, and others favorable to their cause, have gone so far as to claim that the war itself was set off in December 1947 by the Jews in order to create the right circumstances for the mass expulsion of Palestinian Arabs from their homeland.
Until the mid-1960s the Arab claims were usually presented as part of the ideology of Arab nationalism. Palestine was (and ideologically speaking still is) considered part of the greater Arab homeland and the Palestinians part of the greater Arab nation. The aim of the Arab struggle was to preserve the Arab character of Palestine from the Jewish-Zionist threat. The Palestinian case was at best secondary when it was made at all. Only since the middle of the 1960s and particularly after 1967 has the distinctively Palestinian component become relatively stronger among the factors that shape the identity of the Palestinian Arabs.
Jews, and Zionists especially, developed their own myths about Palestine. First they interpreted ancient Jewish history according to the ideology of modern nationalism, equating the old Israelite and Judean kingdoms with modern nation-states. The Maccabean revolt and the period of Hasmonean rule were seen as typical manifestations of the struggle for modern national liberation. During the years when most Jews lived in exile, it was argued, they always kept a separate national identity: they never converted of their free will to another religion, and they preserved the memory of their ancestral land, to which they always hoped to return. Indeed, against all odds, some never left.
Special emphasis was put on this last group. Every bit of evidence that could be found, however trivial it may have been, was used to prove the continuity of the Jewish presence in Eretz Israel and to show that it was central to the life of Jews in exile. Very little was said of the Muslims who meanwhile had become the great majority of the population and the masters of the land. The Zionists argued that Jewish identity and the yearning to return to Palestine were strengthened by the persecutions of the Jews in all parts of the world, including the Islamic and Arab countries.
The return itself was mainly perceived as a matter of Jewish resolve to establish a homeland, which required struggle against Palestine’s foreign rulers—the Ottoman Empire first, and then the British Mandate. The Arab population was not presented as a major obstacle since, it was said, it was so small. Palestine during the late Ottoman and early British periods was portrayed as a barren land, hardly inhabited, whose tiny Arab population consisted mostly of wandering Bedouin tribes whose presence was only temporary.
According to the Zionist myth, only modern Jewish colonization brought about the economic development of Palestine and improved the hard conditions there. These developments, it was said, attracted poor Arabs from the stagnant neighboring countries. Their numbers grew faster than the Jewish immigrants because the malicious British authorities always encouraged them to come and did much to help to absorb them, both economically and legally.
The 1948 war, the Jewish argument continues, erupted because the Arabs rejected the UN partition plan although it offered them much more land than they deserved. And since most of the Palestinian Arabs were in fact aliens, they quickly left the country to return to their permanent homelands. Only the persistent refusal of the rulers of the Arab countries prevented them from being absorbed there. The Jewish refugees from the Arab countries were, on the other hand, cared for and rehabilitated. The result was an “exchange of populations” which should have been confirmed in a political agreement; only Arab intransigence has kept this from taking place.
Both the Arab and the Jewish myths I have described have circulated widely for years. Nothing in either of them is new or revolutionary. The more extreme you were in your Zionist beliefs the more thoroughly you propagated the Jewish mythology. What is surprising is that Joan Peters still writes as if the Zionist myths were wholly true and relevant, notwithstanding all the historical work that modifies or discredits them. The surprise is even greater when one considers her claim to have done original research in the historical archives and even to have discovered “overlooked ‘secret’ (British) correspondence files” in the Public Record Office in London, among other sources of “neglected” information. Indeed, by looking for the “right” evidence and by reading documents selectively one can “prove” virtually anything. But substituting Jewish-Zionist myths for Arab ones will not do. Neither historiography nor the Zionist cause itself gains anything from mythologizing history.
I will deal here only with the main historical questions raised in Mrs. Peters’s book. No doubt, as she claims, the Jews in Muslim countries were neither regarded nor treated as fellow countrymen and equal citizens. Islam protected their lives and most of their religious rights but also kept them in a distinctively inferior position. Legally, their status was defined by the famous “Covenant of Umar,” which listed the various restrictions and special taxes imposed on the “people of the book.”
But the true historical situation cannot be described simply by referring to that covenant, as Mrs. Peters does, or by citing the occasions and places where its provisions were most severely carried out. There was better and worse treatment, and local considerations usually influenced the policy pursued by various rulers. It is typical of Mrs. Peters’s methods that she largely overlooks the position of the Jews under the Ottoman Empire—one of the most important phases of all Islamic history. The reason would seem a simple one: the attitude of the Ottoman authorities toward the Jews was generally fair and decent, and in some parts of the empire many Jews held prominent positions.2 This could not be squared with her description of the oppression of Jews under Islam. (The few references Mrs. Peters makes to the Ottoman rulers emphasize their “anti-Jewish” activities and give a distorted impression of conditions under the Ottomans.)
Part of Mrs. Peters’s confusion derives from her misunderstanding of Zionist history. Zionism was basically a modern secular ideology and movement, a response to the situation of European Jews after their emancipation early in the nineteenth century. Although they had been promised equality as fellow citizens many of them found themselves rejected. That they were ready to adopt their countries’ languages and cultures and sometimes even religions did not help them. Instead of—or in addition to—being rejected on religious and cultural grounds, as they had been since the end of the eleventh century, they were now rejected racially. Zionism offered an alternative. Its ideologists stressed that although in the post-emancipation period most Jews had stopped practicing their religion, they still remained a corporate unit, a distinct people. In order to safeguard their national identity and defend themselves from anti-Semitism the Jews had to return to their ancestral land, restore their national independence, and revive their language and culture.
This position was directly opposed both to the traditional religious attitude of waiting for the Messiah and to the belief in God’s miraculous intervention in history that produced such false messianic movements as Shabbetai Zevi’s. Because Zionism was predominantly a European and secular phenomenon, many Oriental Jews in the Middle East and North Africa have never felt at ease with it and have tried to derive their own sense of Jewish history and identity. In Israel, under the guidance of the former Israeli minister of education, Zevulun Hammer, they have formulated a new Zionism that belittles the ideological and political revolution of European secular Zionism and argues that Theodor Herzl and the Zionist organization had hardly any effect on Jewish history. According to this interpretation Zionism began with Abraham and has been continued by practically all the Jews who have come to the Holy Land, whether to spend their old age and be buried there, or to engage in study or in business. All these are now regarded as Zionists in Oriental Jewish religious circles.
Most historians now consider this view as in fact the opposite of Zionism, but, astonishingly, it has been adopted in its entirety in Mrs. Peters’s book without any serious discussion of its implications. What seems to have been decisive for Mrs. Peters is that the conception fits the myth of Oriental and religious Jewish history she has adopted: since in her view Oriental Jews were always persecuted, they must always have been active Zionists. For her there was no fundamental difference between, on the one hand, a prayer to return to Zion made in Wilna or Marrakesh or the messianism of Shabbetai Zevi, and, on the other, a modern movement that actively organized immigration, established youth organizations, and launched a political struggle for getting political rights in Palestine.
Much of Mrs. Peters’s book argues that at the same time that Jewish immigration to Palestine was rising, Arab immigration to the parts of Palestine where Jews had settled also increased. Therefore, in her view, the Arab claim that an indigenous Arab population was displaced by Jewish immigrants must be false, since many Arabs only arrived with the Jews. The precise demographic history of modern Palestine cannot be summed up briefly, but its main features are clear enough and they are very different from the fanciful description Mrs. Peters gives. It is true that in the middle of the nineteenth century there was neither a “Palestinian nation” nor a “Palestinian identity.” But about four hundred thousand Arabs—the great majority of whom were Muslims—lived in Palestine, which was divided by the Ottomans into three districts. Some of these people were the descendants of the pre-Islamic population that had adopted Islam and the Arabic language; others were members of Bedouin tribes, although the penetration of Bedouins was drastically curtailed after the mid-nineteenth century, when the Ottoman authorities became stronger and more efficient.
As all the research by historians and geographers of modern Palestine shows, the Arab population began to grow again in the middle of the nineteenth century. That growth resulted from a new factor: the demographic revolution. Until the 1850s there was no “natural” increase of the population, but this began to change when modern medical treatment was introduced and modern hospitals were established, both by the the Ottoman authorities and by the foreign Christian missionaries. The number of births remained steady but infant mortality decreased. This was the main reason for Arab population growth, not incursions into the country by the wandering tribes who by then had become afraid of the much more efficient Ottoman troops. Toward the end of Ottoman rule the various contemporary sources no longer lament the outbreak of widespread epidemics. This contrasts with the Arabic chronicles of previous periods in which we find horrible descriptions of recurrent epidemics—typhoid, cholera, bubonic plague—decimating the population. Under the British Mandate, with still better sanitary conditions, more hospitals, and further improvements in medical treatment, the Arab population continued to grow.
The Jews were amazed. In spite of the Jewish immigration, the natural increase of the Arabs—at least twice the rate of the Jews’—slowed down the transformation of the Jews into a majority in Palestine. To account for the delay the theory, or myth, of large-scale immigration of Arabs from the neighboring countries was proposed by Zionist writers. Mrs. Peters accepts that theory completely; she has apparently searched through documents for any statement to the effect that Arabs entered Palestine. But even if we put together all the cases she cites, one cannot escape the conclusion that most of the growth of the Palestinian Arab community resulted from a process of natural increase.
The Mandatory authorities carried out two modern censuses, in 1922 and 1931. Except for some mistakes committed in 1922 in counting the Negev Bedouins, which were corrected in 1931, the returns showed the strength of the “natural process” of increase. The figures for the last years of the mandate are based on continuous collection of data by the department of statistics. These figures showed that in 1947 there were about 1.3 million Arabs living in Palestine.
The strength of the process of natural increase was finally proved not elsewhere but in Israel itself. In 1949 there were about 150,000 Arabs in Israel within the 1949 armistice lines. To that number, one has to add the 20,000-odd refugees who returned to the state as part of the government’s scheme for the “reunion of families.” The Israeli authorities cannot be blamed, as the British “imperialists” were, for helping the Arabs enter the country. And despite the strict control of Israel’s borders, the number of Arabs living in Israel proper has more than trebled since. The rate of the Israeli Arabs’ natural increase rose sharply (between 1964 and 1966 it reached the world record of 4.5 percent a year) and brought about the remarkable increase in the size of that community. No Egyptians, Bedouins, Syrians, Bosnians, etc. were needed.
No one would doubt that some migrant workers came to Palestine from Syria and Trans-Jordan and remained there. But one has to add to this that there were migrations in the opposite direction as well. For example, a tradition developed in Hebron to go to study and work in Cairo, with the result that a permanent community of Hebronites had been living in Cairo since the fifteenth century. Trans-Jordan exported unskilled casual labor to Palestine; but before 1948 its civil service attracted a good many educated Palestinian Arabs who did not find work in Palestine itself. Demographically speaking, however, neither movement of population was significant in comparison to the decisive factor of natural increase.
Most serious students of the history of Palestine would accept that the number of Arab refugees from Israel during and after 1948 claimed by Arab and UN sources—some 600,000 to 750,000—was exaggerated. It is very easy to refute that estimate and many have already done it. Very few historians would accept the claim that all of the refugees, or even most of them, were deliberately expelled by the Israelis any more than they would accept the Israeli counterclaim that all left of their own accord. Mrs. Peters has gone to great lengths to collect the statements made by Arabs in which they admit that the Palestinian Arab refugees left Palestine because they expected Arab military victory, after which they intended to return. Nevertheless, although she admits that in sporadic instances Arabs were expelled, she ignores evidence of Israeli intentions to expel them. I would like to draw her attention to one document which proves that the Haganah did in certain circumstances have such an intention.
As historians of the 1948 war know well, the Haganah prepared in March 1948 a strategic plan (the Dalet or “fourth” plan) to deal with the imminent invasion of Palestine by the Arab countries. A major aim of the plan was to form a continuous territory joining the lands held by the Jewish settlements. The plan clearly states that if Arab villages violently opposed the Jewish attempt to gain control, their populations would be expelled. The text was first made public in Israel in 1972 as an appendix to the last volume of the semiofficial History of the Haganah.
I do not know why Mrs. Peters overlooked this important document. That the plan existed, of course, is not in itself evidence that it was carried out. Neither, however, is the admission of the Syrian leader Khalid al-Azm that the Arab countries urged the Palestinian Arabs to leave their villages until after the victory of the Arab armies final proof that the Palestinian Arabs in practice heeded that call and consequently left. Since Mrs. Peters supposedly took the trouble to read Khalid al-Azm’s Arabic memoirs, she at least should have consulted the appendix of the History of the Haganah‘s last volume.^3
Mrs. Peters puts great emphasis on the claim that during and after the 1948 war an “exchange of populations” took place. Against the Arabs who left Palestine one had to put, in her view, about the same number of Jews, most of them driven by the Arab rulers from their traditional homes in the Arab world. And indeed there is a superficial similarity between the two movements of population. But their ideological and historical significance is entirely different. From a Jewish-Zionist point of view the immigration of the Jews of the Arab countries to Israel, expelled or not, was the fulfillment of a national dream—the “ingathering of the exiles.” Since the 1930s the Jewish Agency had sent agents, teachers, and instructors to the various Arab countries in order to propagate Zionism. They organized Zionist youth movements there and illegal immigration to Palestine. Israel then made great efforts to absorb these immigrants into its national, political, social, and economic life.
For the Palestinian Arabs the flight of 1948 was completely different. It resulted in an unwanted national calamity that was accompanied by unending personal tragedies. The result was the collapse of the Palestinian community, the fragmentation of a people, and the loss of a country that had in the past been mostly Arabic-speaking and Islamic. No wonder that the Arabs look at what happened very differently. When Mrs. Peters argues, as many Israeli and pro-Israeli spokesmen once did, that all refugees should live and be rehabilitated in their new countries, the Arabs reply that all refugees should go back to their countries of origin. When, in 1976, they invited former Jewish citizens to return, they did so not only from the mistaken belief that Oriental Jews’ attachment to Israel was weak, but also from the need to refute the Israeli argument, now repeated forcefully by Mrs. Peters, that there was a symmetry between the two movements of population.
By stressing and strengthening the claim of symmetry Mrs. Peters plays, at least from an ideological point of view and certainly against her own wishes, into the hands of Arab propaganda. Many Israeli agents in such Arab countries as Iraq, Yemen, and Morocco made courageous efforts to bring about the aliyah (ascendance, the usual Hebrew word for immigration to Israel) of the Oriental Jews of Arab countries. Did this dangerous work count for nothing? Were the immigrants merely ordinary refugees and not people ascending to Zion? By attempting to equate the Arab refugees with the Jewish immigrants, Mrs. Peters, in my view, tarnishes a heroic chapter in Zionist history.
Mrs. Peters’s use of sources is very selective and tendentious, to say the least. In order to strengthen the impression that the “hidden hand” of history somehow brought about the reasonable solution of exchange of Jewish and Arab populations, Mrs. Peters evidently wanted to show that the concept had an honorable lineage. She quotes an “Arab leader” who talked of a population exchange in a leaflet distributed in Damascus in 1939, and gives his name as Mojli Amin. I challenge any reader to identify this “leader.” He is not mentioned in any of the books on Syria I know of, although I have read many. And if some wholly unimportant writer made such a statement, how can any serious importance be attached to it? But beyond that, I think that the leaflet is a fake. During the spring of 1939 internal dissent was at its most intense among the factions of the militant Palestinian Arabs, which included anti-British rebels, anti-Jewish rebels, and the “Peace Companies,” which opposed rebellion. In Damascus, where the headquarters of the rebels were located, faked leaflets were often distributed in order to add to the dissension. I suspect that this leaflet was another example of the same literary genre. If Mrs. Peters had more thoroughly investigated the files of the Arab section of the political department of the Jewish Agency, she would, I hope, have seen why the evidence she cites should be used more cautiously.
One flawed source was not enough, however. Mrs. Peters claims that “the British had proposed the exchange of ‘Arab population in Palestine’ for Jews elsewhere.” If one looks for the evidence for this claim, one suddenly realizes that “the British” are none other than William Ormsby-Gore (not yet Lord) who had privately supported the idea. It is odd to conclude from this that “the British” supported such an idea, all the more so when one recalls that when Ormsby-Gore served as British colonial secretary in charge of Palestine he never used his official position to promote that idea as such. The only exchange of populations he officially envisaged was to have been a part of the 1937 partition plan that allocated 15 percent of Palestine to the Jews and recommended that the Arabs be forcibly removed from the territory on which the proposed Jewish state would be founded.
If Mrs. Peters had spent more than “weeks” in the Public Record Office (the official British archives) or if she had read the relevant historical research she would have known that a similar offer was brought to the members of the British cabinet but rejected. We now know that between 1939 and 1941 Churchill favored a diplomatic initiative that would have included the transfer of the Palestinian Arabs to a federal Arab state under Ibn Saud. He had been convinced that such a transfer was desirable by Chaim Weizmann, who had discussed the possibility with H. St. John Philby. Churchill presented a version of Weizmann’s proposal to his colleagues on May 19, 1941. He succeeded only in provoking a hostile reaction on the part of the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, who made his famous pro-Arab speech of May 29, 1941, in reaction to Churchill’s proposition. Several days afterward Eden’s speech was endorsed by the British cabinet. So much for the “British” origins of the concept of exchange of populations.
Of course there was no separate state called Palestine before the British Mandate and there is no need to demonstrate this at length, as Mrs. Peters tries to do. Nonetheless a large majority of Muslim Arabs inhabited the land; and the desire to keep it that way was the goal of the Arab struggle in Palestine against the Jews and the British. Of what possible significance, therefore, is Mrs. Peters’s claim that Arab domination of Palestine after its conquest by the Muslims in 635 AD lasted only twenty-two years? Was the land empty of any population? Such a vague claim is typical of many others made in the book. What is more surprising is the authority on which it is based. We are told that a statement to this effect was made in February 1919 to the Paris Peace Conference by “the Muslim chairman of the Syrian delegation.” An innocent reader would take it that this delegation was representing the Arab population of Syria, who were then struggling for independence. In fact the delegation was organized by the French as a device to oppose the nationalist struggle, and its chairman would have said anything required by his masters. Whether the Palestinian Arabs saw their identity as having local roots or whether they saw themselves more as part of the larger Arab world, they undoubtedly wanted Palestine to remain Arab. That the name of the country in Arabic, as in most other languages, is derived from the name of the Philistines does not matter to them any more than the fact that the name of Jerusalem, even in Hebrew, is derived from the Jebusees. All such terminological claims, and there are plenty of them in Mrs. Peters’s book, are worthless.
Mrs. Peters puts forward yet another familiar Zionist argument—which has the advantage of being true—that already in the nineteenth century Jews made up the majority in Jerusalem, Safed, and Tiberias. But if we say that having a majority is the key factor in determining the national character of any given town or area, why not apply this principle, the Arabs may ask, to the land as a whole?
Surprisingly enough, Mrs. Peters does just this when she implies that in 1893 the Jews were virtually the majority community in the parts of Palestine where Jews had settled. Her very tendentious reasoning on this point has already been exposed.4 What she has done, to put it briefly, is to compare the figures for non-Jews in the 1893 Ottoman census of Palestine with the estimate of the Jewish population proposed by the French geographer Vital Cuinet in 1895. She dismisses the Ottoman figures for the Jews because, she says, “the Ottoman Census apparently registered only known Ottoman subjects; since most Jews had failed to obtain Ottoman citizenship, a representative figure of the Palestinian Jewish population could not be extrapolated from the 1893 Census.”
This may sound plausible, until one discovers, first, that Cuinet’s estimates are generally considered to be unreliable, and, second, that Professor Kemal Karpat of the University of Wisconsin, whose analysis of the Ottoman census Peters relies on, does not find the census estimate of the Jewish population to be inaccurate in the way she claims. (Even with the numbers that she does arrive at, incidentally, Mrs. Peters does not make a case for a Jewish majority. Although she argues there were more Jews than Muslims or Christians—59,500 as compared to 56,000 and 38,000—there were more Muslims andChristians than Jews by her own account.)
If the Arabs had indeed been as few as Mrs. Peters claims, one wonders why the letters, official reports, diaries, and essays of the early Zionist settlers—the “Lovers of Zion”—from the last two decades of the nineteenth century were filled with references to the Arabs surrounding them everywhere in Palestine. Those writings were collected many years ago and published by Asher Druyanov.5 Republished several years ago they are now easily accessible, but apparently not for Mrs. Peters. Similarly, she has overlooked two of the most important articles by Jewish writers dealing with the Arab problem, which even around the turn of the century troubled the Jewish immigrants to Palestine. The first was written in 1891 by Ahad Ha’am, perhaps the greatest modern Jewish thinker, and was called “Truth from Palestine”; the second, called “Hidden Question,” was written in 1907 by Y. Epstein and published in Ha-Shiloah. Both writers exhorted their fellow Jews in Palestine to take seriously the large Arab population and its feelings; the Ottoman Empire might go, they wrote, but the Arabs would remain. Anyone who believes Mrs. Peters’s book would have to conclude that these distinguished writers, a philosopher and an educator with close experience of life in Palestine, had simply invented the existence of the many Arabs there.
I am reluctant to bore the reader and myself with further examples of Mrs. Peters’s highly tendentious use—or neglect—of the available source material. Much more important is her misunderstanding of basic historical processes and her failure to appreciate the central importance of natural population increase as compared to migratory movements. Readers of her book should be warned not to accept its factual claims without checking their sources. Judging by the interest that the book aroused and the prestige of some who have endorsed it, I thought it would present some new interpretation of the historical facts. I found none. Everyone familiar with the writing of the extreme nationalists of Zeev Jabotinsky’s Revisionist party (the forerunner of the Herut party) would immediately recognize the tired and discredited arguments in Mrs. Peters’s book. I had mistakenly thought them long forgotten. It is a pity that they have been given new life.
Letters

1  To mention only a few of the reviews, Walter Reich in The Atlantic (July 1984), Ronald Sanders in The New Republic(April 23, 1984), Bernard Gwertzman in The New York Times (May 12, 1984), and Daniel Pipes in Commentary (July 1984) were among the more favorable. Alexander Cockburn and Edward Said in The Nation (October 13, 1984 and October 19, 1985), Norman G. Finkelstein in In These Times (September 5–11, 1984), Bill Farrell in the Journal of Palestine Studies (Fall 1984), and Ian and David Gilmour in The London Review of Books (February 7, 1985) have been critical of Peters's book.
The Fate of an Honest Intellectual
Noam Chomsky
Excerpted from Understanding Power, The New Press, 2002, pp. 244-248
I'll tell you another, last case—and there are many others like this. Here's a story which is really tragic. How many of you know about Joan Peters, the book by Joan Peters? There was this best-seller a few years ago [in 1984], it went through about ten printings, by a woman named Joan Peters—or at least, signed by Joan Peters—called From Time Immemorial. It was a big scholarly-looking book with lots of footnotes, which purported to show that the Palestinians were all recent immigrants [i.e. to the Jewish-settled areas of the former Palestine, during the British mandate years of 1920 to 1948].

And it was very popular—it got literally hundreds of rave reviews, and no negative reviews: the Washington Post, the New York Times, everybody was just raving about it. Here was this book which proved that there were really no Palestinians! Of course, the implicit message was, if Israel kicks them all out there's no moral issue, because they're just recent immigrants who came in because the Jews had built up the country. And there was all kinds of demographic analysis in it, and a big professor of demography at the University of Chicago [Philip M. Hauser] authenticated it. That was the big intellectual hit for that year: Saul Bellow, Barbara Tuchman, everybody was talking about it as the greatest thing since chocolate cake.

Well, one graduate student at Princeton, a guy named Norman Finkelstein, started reading through the book. He was interested in the history of Zionism, and as he read the book he was kind of surprised by some of the things it said. He's a very careful student, and he started checking the references—and it turned out that the whole thing was a hoax, it was completely faked: probably it had been put together by some intelligence agency or something like that. Well, Finkelstein wrote up a short paper of just preliminary findings, it was about twenty-five pages or so, and he sent it around to I think thirty people who were interested in the topic, scholars in the field and so on, saying: "Here's what I've found in this book, do you think it's worth pursuing?"

Well, he got back one answer, from me. I told him, yeah, I think it's an interesting topic, but I warned him, if you follow this, you're going to get in trouble—because you're going to expose the American intellectual community as a gang of frauds, and they are not going to like it, and they're going to destroy you. So I said: if you want to do it, go ahead, but be aware of what you're getting into. It's an important issue, it makes a big difference whether you eliminate the moral basis for driving out a population—it's preparing the basis for some real horrors—so a lot of people's lives could be at stake. But your life is at stake too, I told him, because if you pursue this, your career is going to be ruined.

Well, he didn't believe me. We became very close friends after this, I didn't know him before. He went ahead and wrote up an article, and he started submitting it to journals. Nothing: they didn't even bother responding. I finally managed to place a piece of it in In These Times, a tiny left-wing journal published in Illinois, where some of you may have seen it. Otherwise nothing, no response. Meanwhile his professors—this is Princeton University, supposed to be a serious place—stopped talking to him: they wouldn't make appointments with him, they wouldn't read his papers, he basically had to quit the program.

By this time, he was getting kind of desperate, and he asked me what to do. I gave him what I thought was good advice, but what turned out to be bad advice: I suggested that he shift over to a different department, where I knew some people and figured he'd at least be treated decently. That turned out to be wrong. He switched over, and when he got to the point of writing his thesis he literally could not get the faculty to read it, he couldn't get them to come to his thesis defense. Finally, out of embarrassment, they granted him a Ph.D.—he's very smart, incidentally—but they will not even write a letter for him saying that he was a student at Princeton University. I mean, sometimes you have students for whom it's hard to write good letters of recommendation, because you really didn't think they were very good—but you can write something, there are ways of doing these things. This guy was good, but he literally cannot get a letter.

He's now living in a little apartment somewhere in New York City, and he's a part-time social worker working with teenage drop-outs. Very promising scholar—if he'd done what he was told, he would have gone on and right now he'd be a professor somewhere at some big university. Instead he's working part-time with disturbed teenaged kids for a couple thousand dollars a year. That's a lot better than a death squad, it's true—it's a whole lot better than a death squad. But those are the techniques of control that are around.

But let me just go on with the Joan Peters story. Finkelstein's very persistent: he took a summer off and sat in the New York Public Library, where he went through every single reference in the book—and he found a record of fraud that you cannot believe. Well, the New York intellectual community is a pretty small place, and pretty soon everybody knew about this, everybody knew the book was a fraud and it was going to be exposed sooner or later. The one journal that was smart enough to react intelligently was the New York Review of Books—they knew that the thing was a sham, but the editor didn't want to offend his friends, so he just didn't run a review at all. That was the one journal that didn't run a review.

Meanwhile, Finkelstein was being called in by big professors in the field who were telling him, "Look, call off your crusade; you drop this and we'll take care of you, we'll make sure you get a job," all this kind of stuff. But he kept doing it—he kept on and on. Every time there was a favorable review, he'd write a letter to the editor which wouldn't get printed; he was doing whatever he could do. We approached the publishers and asked them if they were going to respond to any of this, and they said no—and they were right. Why should they respond? They had the whole system buttoned up, there was never going to be a critical word about this in the United States. But then they made a technical error: they allowed the book to appear in England, where you can't control the intellectual community quite as easily.

Well, as soon as I heard that the book was going to come out in England, I immediately sent copies of Finkelstein's work to a number of British scholars and journalists who are interested in the Middle East—and they were ready. As soon as the book appeared, it was just demolished, it was blown out of the water. Every major journal, the Times Literary Supplement, the London Review, the Observer, everybody had a review saying, this doesn't even reach the level of nonsense, of idiocy. A lot of the criticism used Finkelstein's work without any acknowledgment, I should say—but about the kindest word anybody said about the book was "ludicrous," or "preposterous."

Well, people here read British reviews—if you're in the American intellectual community, you read the Times Literary Supplement and the London Review, so it began to get a little embarrassing. You started getting back-tracking: people started saying, "Well, look, I didn't really say the book was good, I just said it's an interesting topic," things like that. At that point, the New York Review swung into action, and they did what they always do in these circumstances. See, there's like a routine that you go through—if a book gets blown out of the water in England in places people here will see, or if a book gets praised in England, you have to react. And if it's a book on Israel, there's a standard way of doing it: you get an Israeli scholar to review it. That's called covering your ass—because whatever an Israeli scholar says, you're pretty safe: no one can accuse the journal of anti-Semitism, none of the usual stuff works.

So after the Peters book got blown out of the water in England, the New York Review assigned it to a good person actually, in fact Israel's leading specialist on Palestinian nationalism [Yehoshua Porath], someone who knows a lot about the subject. And he wrote a review, which they then didn't publish—it went on for almost a year without the thing being published; nobody knows exactly what was going on, but you can guess that there must have been a lot of pressure not to publish it. Eventually it was even written up in the New York Times that this review wasn't getting published, so finally some version of it did appear. It was critical, it said the book is nonsense and so on, but it cut corners, the guy didn't say what he knew.

Actually, the Israeli reviews in general were extremely critical: the reaction of the Israeli press was that they hoped the book would not be widely read, because ultimately it would be harmful to the Jews—sooner or later it would get exposed, and then it would just look like a fraud and a hoax, and it would reflect badly on Israel. They underestimated the American intellectual community, I should say.

Anyhow, by that point the American intellectual community realized that the Peters book was an embarrassment, and it sort of disappeared—nobody talks about it anymore. I mean, you still find it at newsstands in the airport and so on, but the best and the brightest know that they are not supposed to talk about it anymore: because it was exposed and they were exposed.

Well, the point is, what happened to Finkelstein is the kind of thing that can happen when you're an honest critic—and we could go on and on with other cases like that. [Editors' Note: Finkelstein has since published several books with independent presses.]

Still, in the universities or in any other institution, you can often find some dissidents hanging around in the woodwork—and they can survive in one fashion or another, particularly if they get community support. But if they become too disruptive or too obstreperous—or you know, too effective—they're likely to be kicked out. The standard thing, though, is that they won't make it within the institutions in the first place, particularly if they were that way when they were young—they'll simply be weeded out somewhere along the line. So in most cases, the people who make it through the institutions and are able to remain in them have already internalized the right kinds of beliefs: it's not a problem for them to be obedient, they already are obedient, that's how they got there. And that's pretty much how the ideological control system perpetuates itself in the schools—that's the basic story of how it operates, I think.

donderdag 26 december 2013

Hoe de hypotheekrenteaftrek uitgroeide tot een gruwel....


Door: Yvonne Hofs − 25/12/13, 10:00
© ANP. Stapels verhuisdozen in een woonkamer.
VONK Het idee was een eigen huis voor iedereen, maar aanmoedigen van het woningbezit draaide uit op een hoop schulden. Waar ging het mis?
  • Tot op de dag van vandaag ontbreken overtuigende bewijzen dat het huiseigenaarschap maatschappelijke voordelen heeft
  • © anp.
In een verhaal over de Nederlandse huizenmarktzeepbel kunnen we niet om de Franse socioloog Émile Durkheim heen. Durkheim publiceerde in 1897 de eerste sociologische studie over zelfmoord, maar daar gaan we het nu niet over hebben. Zo erg is het nou ook weer niet gesteld met de Nederlandse huizenmarkt. Vier jaar eerder, hetzelfde jaar dat Nederland de hypotheekrenteaftrek invoerde, zette Durkheim zijn theorie over sociale cohesie op papier. In De la division du travail social stelt Durkheim dat het bindmiddel van menselijke samenlevingen bestaat uit gedeelde normen en waarden. De leden van de groep ontlenen een deel van hun identiteit aan dit collectieve bewustzijn van morele opvattingen, geloofsartikelen, ideeën en sentimenten. Zo'n collectief bewustzijn vervulde een cruciale rol in premoderne samenlevingen. De overlevingskansen van individuen hingen toen sterk af van samenwerking binnen de groep.

Maar het nadeel van een collectief bewustzijn is dat de ideeën en opvattingen die er deel van uitmaken, niet ter discussie mogen worden gesteld. Aan het gezamenlijke normen- en waardenstelsel mag niet worden getwijfeld, omdat zulke twijfel het fundament van de samenleving bedreigt. In sociologische experimenten blijkt steeds dat groepen agressief reageren op andersdenkenden. Het collectief zet vrijdenkers onder zware druk om zich te conformeren aan de groepsnormen. Pressie is vaak niet eens nodig om individuen tot aanpassing te bewegen. De meeste mensen conformeren zich vrijwillig, omdat ze geen buitenstaander willen zijn.

Spaarzin
Ook Nederland kent een collectief bewustzijn. Het poldermodel, het streven naar consensus, is bijvoorbeeld stevig ingebed in onze nationale cultuur. Kort na de Tweede Wereldoorlog werd ons collectieve bewustzijn verrijkt met twee nieuwe dogma's. Dit zijn: 'het eigenwoningbezit moet bevorderd worden' en 'een koophuis is een goede investering'.

Het waren de christelijke partijen KVP en ARP (voorlopers van het CDA) die begin jaren vijftig 'bezitsvorming' begonnen te propageren als middel om het volk te beschaven. In de jaren vijftig kende Nederland meerdere ministers en staatssecretarissen van Bezitsvorming, allen van confessionele huize. 'Er moet meer en meer gespaard worden, vindt de regering', schrijft het socialistische dagblad Het Vrije Volk op 8 oktober 1966. Het kabinet-Cals stimuleert dat onder meer met 'gerichte activiteiten met betrekking tot financiering van de woningbouw en vooral het bevorderen van het eigenwoningbezit'.

De christelijke partijen brachten spaarzin in verband met verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel, properheid en stabiele gezinnen. Huren werd geassocieerd met drankzucht en andere goddeloze neigingen, en met kortzichtig leven van loonzakje naar loonzakje. Het eigen huis stond in de christelijke politiek symbool voor het nette burgermansbestaan en de verheffing van de arbeider naar de middenklasse.

Kip of ei
Die arbeider stond niet te springen om huiseigenaar te worden. In het kader van de wederopbouw heerste in de jaren vijftig en zestig een regime van geleide loonpolitiek. De overheid had met de vakbonden afgesproken dat de lonen maar beperkt mochten stijgen. Als tegenprestatie beloofde de regering dat de kosten van levensonderhoud min of meer gelijk zouden blijven. De huren waren streng gereguleerd en laag. De huurlasten van een gezin bedroegen gemiddeld 7 procent van het besteedbaar inkomen, tegen 23 procent nu.

De socialisten namen dan ook niet deel aan de lofzang op het eigenwoningbezit. De Wiardi Beckmanstichting waarschuwde in 1949 dat eigenwoningbezit alleen verantwoord zou zijn 'in streken met (een) stabiele, economisch krachtige en spaarzame bevolking en dan alleen nog voor gezinnen die deze eigenschappen ten volle bezitten'. 'Waar de economische positie zwak of wisselvallig is, wordt een eigen huis spoedig een ernstige belemmering.'

Tot op de dag van vandaag ontbreken overtuigende bewijzen dat het huiseigenaarschap maatschappelijke voordelen heeft. Ja, er zijn talloze onderzoeken waaruit blijkt dat huiseigenaren gemiddeld tevredener zijn over hun woonsituatie dan huurders, dat ze hun huis beter onderhouden, dat hun kinderen het beter doen op school en dat ze meer maatschappelijk betrokken zijn. Maar al die onderzoeken gaan bij nadere beschouwing voorbij aan de kip-of-eivraag: veranderen mensen omdat zij een koophuis bezitten of is het andersom en wordt een bepaald soort mensen (hogere inkomens) huiseigenaar? Dat woningbezitters tevredener zijn dan huurders is nogal wiedes. Koopwoningen staan in gemiddeld betere wijken en zijn gemiddeld groter en luxer. Dat huiseigenaren meer onderhoud plegen, is ook nogal wiedes. Zij hebben immers financieel voordeel van een goed onderhouden huis en huurders niet.
  • Waar de economische positie zwak of wisselvallig is, wordt een eigen huis spoedig een ernstige belemmering
  • © anp.
  • Ruim 59 procent van de Nederlanders woont in een koopwoning, maar al staat hún naam op de eigendomsakte, de huishoudens met een onderwaterhypotheek huren hun woning in feite van de bank.
Mythe
Nu de huizenprijzen zijn gedaald, komen de nadelen van eigenwoningbezit aan het licht. Verhuizen met een restschuld is moeilijk; 800 duizend (CBS) tot 1,3 miljoen huishoudens (DNB) - de schattingen variëren - kunnen geen kant op. Er is dus geen objectieve reden om het eigenwoningbezit te bevorderen.

Je kunt er zelfs over twisten of 'bezit' de juiste term is. Ruim 59 procent van de Nederlanders woont in een koopwoning, maar al staat hún naam op de eigendomsakte, de huishoudens met een onderwaterhypotheek huren hun woning in feite van de bank. Starters die in 2007 een huis kochten leenden gemiddeld 114 procent van de woningwaarde. Nog geen 14 procent van de Nederlandse huiseigenaren is hypotheekvrij en kan zich met recht 'woningbezitter' noemen.

Decennia van intensief overheidsbeleid om het eigenwoningbezit te stimuleren hebben het tegenovergestelde bereikt: schuldvorming in plaats van bezitsvorming. Hoe kon dat gebeuren? Door een fatale combinatie van onbeperkte hypotheekrenteaftrek en vergaande zelfregulering in de financiële sector. Sommigen menen dat de hypotheekrenteaftrek niet de oorzaak van de woningmarktcrisis kan zijn, omdat die al sinds 1893 bestaat en tot ver na de oorlog geen problemen opleverde. Deze woningmarktvorsers zien over het hoofd dat pas vanaf eind jaren zeventig de aftrek optimaal werd benut, doordat banken ineens vrijwel onbeperkt mochten uitlenen en doordat het eigenwoningbezit explosief groeide.

Tot na de Tweede Wereldoorlog waren koopwoningen iets voor de elite. Banken leenden huizenkopers hoogstens 70 procent van de koopsom. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) legde de kredietverlening na de oorlog aan banden om de inflatie te beteugelen. DNB eiste bovendien dat de banken hun beperkte uitleencapaciteit hoofdzakelijk aan bedrijfskredieten zouden spenderen. Bedrijfsinvesteringen werden van groter economisch belang geacht dan de consumptie van woningen. In 1947 bewoonde slechts 28 procent van de bevolking een koopwoning.

Dat de hypotheekrenteaftrek beoogt het eigenwoningbezit te stimuleren is een hardnekkige mythe. De hypotheekrenteaftrek is bedacht als verkapte subsidie aan de rijken. De liberale minister van Financiën Klaas Pierson voerde de maatregel in 1893 in als onderdeel van de nieuwe inkomstenbelasting met progressieve belastingschijven. Welgestelden zouden daardoor veel meer belasting gaan betalen. Zij moesten voortaan ook belasting afdragen over hun koophuis, via het huurwaardeforfait. Als het bezit van een woning wordt belast, moeten de kosten van dat bezit (zoals onderhoud en hypotheek) aftrekbaar zijn, vond Pierson. Zo kon hij de nadelige effecten van de progressieve inkomstenbelasting voor de bovenklasse wat verzachten. Vanaf dag één kostte de hypotheekrenteaftrek de schatkist meer dan het huurwaardeforfait opbracht. Die kosten waren in het begin vrij laag, omdat er maar weinig huiseigenaren waren.

Groeihypotheek
Dat veranderde vanaf de jaren zestig. Tussen 1967 en 1975 groeide het eigenwoningbezit in Nederland van 32 naar 39 procent. Een van de redenen daarvoor was dat het liberale kabinet-De Quay in 1962 een huurstijging van 20 procent toestond en bezuinigde op de huursubsidies. Tegelijkertijd werd kopen steeds aantrekkelijker. In 1956 had het derde kabinet-Drees de gemeentegarantie ingevoerd, de voorloper van de Nationale Hypotheekgarantie. Gemeenten steunden huizenkopers met een laag inkomen door voor 100 procent van de koopsom garant te staan. Eerst gold die garantie alleen voor nieuwbouwwoningen, maar in 1973 werd hij uitgebreid naar bestaande woningen. Omdat banken dankzij de gemeentegarantie nul risico liepen op zulke hypotheken, vonden ze het geen probleem meer om hypotheken tot 100 procent van de koopsom te verstrekken.

De regering-De Quay gaf vanwege het grote arbeidstekort in Nederland in 1962 ook de loonmatiging op. De vakbonden dwongen daarna in cao-onderhandelingen af dat de lonen automatisch zouden meestijgen met de inflatie. De inflatie was gemiddeld 2,1 procent in de jaren vijftig, 5,1 procent in de jaren zestig en 7 procent in de jaren zeventig. Op het laatst stegen de lonen met 8 tot 10 procent per jaar. Hypotheken waren spotgoedkoop, want schulden verdampen in rap tempo als geld snel aan waarde verliest en de inkomens hard stijgen. In de eerste helft van de jaren zeventig was de reële hypotheekrente (na belastingaftrek en na inflatiecorrectie) zelfs enige jaren negatief. Huizenkopers verdienden geld door geld te lenen.

Onder leiding van Jelle Zijlstra liet ook De Nederlandsche Bank de teugels vieren. Banken mochten vanaf 1972 welhaast onbeperkt krediet verlenen aan huizenkopers. Die hadden toen slechts de keus tussen een lineaire en annuïtaire hypotheek. In 1977 vonden de banken een hypotheekvorm uit die de maandlasten van huizenkopers verlaagde, waardoor die zich nog hogere hypotheken konden veroorloven. Met een 'groeihypotheek' betaalden kopers de eerste jaren geen rente en aflossing; die werden bij de bestaande hypotheekschuld opgeteld. Na enkele jaren schoten de maandlasten natuurlijk de lucht in. Banken en huizenkopers gingen ervan uit dat dit geen enkel probleem was, omdat de lonen zo hard stegen. In deze tijd raakten ook tophypotheken van 125 tot 130 procent van de woningwaarde in zwang. Ongekend in het buitenland, waar de loan-to-value meestal aan een wettelijk maximum gebonden is. Dankzij deze enorme kredietverruiming werden koopwoningen tussen 1972 en 1978 maar liefst 85 procent duurder.
  • © anp.
Crisis
De prijsstijging stokte in 1978 nadat DNB een jaar eerder de kredietkraan had dichtgedraaid. De centrale bank vond dat de kredietverstrekking vervaarlijke proporties aannam. Nederlanders leenden zich niet alleen suf voor de aankoop van een huis, maar ook voor pure consumptie. De ABN kwam begin 1977 met een Planpotheek, een doorlopend consumptief krediet met het eigen huis als onderpand. Vanaf 1978 ging de hypotheekrente hard omhoog, omdat de Amerikaanse centrale bank de ene na de andere renteverhoging doorvoerde. De tweede oliecrisis wierp Nederland het jaar daarop in een recessie. In 1982 maakte het akkoord van Wassenaar een einde aan de automatische koppeling tussen de lonen en de inflatie. Huiseigenaren met een groeihypotheek of een variabele hypotheekrente konden hun woning niet meer betalen en moesten die te koop zetten. De reële huizenprijzen kelderden tussen 1978 en 1982 met 45 procent.

Die woningmarktcrisis van de jaren tachtig had ons een paar dingen moeten leren. Dat de huizenprijzen ook in Nederland kunnen dalen, met alle problemen van dien. En dat de huizenprijzen hier sterk bepaald worden door de kredietmogelijkheden. Waarschuwingen over een mogelijke zeepbel op de Nederlandse huizenmarkt zijn decennialang weggewuifd met het argument dat de hoge huizenprijzen in Nederland het gevolg waren van schaarste: er wordt immers minder gebouwd dan de woningbehoefte. 'Zonder een structurele vergroting van het aanbod zal dit leiden tot toenemende schaarste en stijgende prijzen', waarschuwde onder meer de Makelaarsvereniging Amsterdam in 2010 in een analyse van de Amsterdamse woningmarkt. In april 2008 serveerde het Centraal Planbureau waarschuwingen van het IMF over de overwaardering op de huizenmarkt nog af met de bewering dat het IMF 'geen rekening houdt met de specifieke woningmarktsituatie in Nederland'.

Maar het schaarste-argument is vals. 'Vraag' is niet de enige factor die de huizenprijzen bepaalt. Mensen kunnen zoveel willen; ze moeten hun wens wel kunnen betalen. Veel automobilisten dromen van een Ferrari. Waarom zie je dan zo weinig Ferrari's op de weg? Omdat maar weinigen zich een Ferrari kunnen veroorloven. Als potentiële huizenkopers de vraagprijzen niet kunnen ophoesten, wordt er niks meer verkocht totdat de prijzen dalen.

Zowel in de jaren zeventig als na 1985 heeft het eindeloos oprekken van de leennormen de huizenprijzen opgestuwd tot ver boven de loonstijging en de inflatie. Nederlanders hebben huizen gekocht op de pof. Ze hebben een deel van hun toekomstige inkomsten verpand aan de bank en vroegtijdig geconsumeerd op de huizenmarkt. Maar aan het oprekken van de kredietverlening zitten grenzen. Er komt een moment waarop kopers ook met kunst- en vliegwerk de benodigde hypotheek niet meer kunnen opbrengen en afhaken. Dan kantelt de markt en gaan de prijzen dalen.
  • De aftrek heeft de huizenprijzen opgejaagd, waardoor zij meer voor hun huis moesten betalen
  • © anp.
Wie hebben allemaal van de hypotheekaftrek geprofiteerd? In elk geval niet de huizenkopers. De aftrek heeft de huizenprijzen opgejaagd, waardoor zij meer voor hun huis moesten betalen. Dankzij de hypotheekrenteaftrek hebben huizenbezitters een hogere schuld dan ze anders hadden gehad. De hypotheekrenteaftrek verzacht weliswaar de symptomen (lees: de rentelasten), maar geneest de ziekte (de hypotheekschuld) niet. Het aflossen van de hoge hypotheek en het vermogensverlies door de 'overbetaling' zijn voor rekening van de huiseigenaar.

De echte profiteurs van de hypotheekrenteaftrek zijn banken en verzekeraars, financieel adviseurs, makelaars, bouwbedrijven, grondspeculanten en gemeenten.
  • Bank verdient flink aan hypotheek waarbij de huizenkoper niet aflost
  • © anp.
Banken

De profiteurs van de huizenbubbel, banken, bouwbedrijven, makelaars en gemeenten, krijgen nu ook harde klappen.

Banken en verzekeraars verdienden flink aan slimme hypotheekconstructies die de hypotheekrentaftrek optimaal benutten door de aflossing 30 jaar uit te stellen, of waarbij de huiseigenaar helemaal niet aflost. Vanaf de tweede helft van de jaren tachtig zetten de banken de kredietkraan weer steeds wijder open. Sinds 1993 wordt het tweede inkomen volledig meegeteld bij het bepalen van het maximale hypotheekbedrag. De spaarhypotheek en de aflossingsvrije hypotheek kwamen rond 1987 op de markt. Begin jaren negentig werd de beleggingshypotheek geïntroduceerd, in 2008 gevolgd door de bankspaarhypotheek.

Deze hypotheken zijn extra lucratief voor de banken, want een hypotheek van 300 duizend euro waarop 30 jaar niet wordt afgelost, kost 450 duizend euro (bij een lage hypotheekrente van 5 procent). Een huizenkoper betaalt dus anderhalf keer zoveel rente als het bedrag dat hij leent. Bij hogere rentes is die verhouding nog schever. De koper krijgt 42 of 52 procent terug van de fiscus, zodat deze aflossingsvrije lening hem netto hoogstens 261 duizend euro kost.

Maar de hypotheekverstrekker krijgt gewoon de volle 450 duizend euro. Banken straffen voortijdig aflossen niet voor niets af met hoge boetes. Ze willen dat ontmoedigen, want dan vangen ze minder rente.
Financieel adviseurs, die tot dit jaar betaald werden door de hypotheekverstrekkers, ontraadden hun klanten dan ook binnen 30 jaar af te lossen. Vanwege de hypotheekrenteaftrek hadden ze nog een punt ook. Zolang de spaarrente minus de vermogensrendementsheffing hoger is dan de netto hypotheekrente, kun je je geld inderdaad beter op een spaarrekening zetten. Veel huiseigenaren deden dat echter niet, die gaven het geld uit. De zogenoemde 'vrije besparingen' zijn in Nederland al tien jaar negatief. De gemiddelde Nederlander spaart veel onder dwang voor zijn pensioen, via de verplichte pensioenpremieafdracht. Maar hij teert in op het vermogen dat hij zelf beheert.

Bouwondernemers, makelaars  en gemeenten hebben allen belang bij hoge huizenprijzen. De bouwkosten zijn tussen 1996 en 2001 sterk gestegen, in 2001 met liefst 13 procent. Dat had alles te maken met hogere grondprijzen. De gemeenten verhoogden die om hun kas te spekken.

Nu de huizenzeepbel voor de tweede keer is uiteengespat, moeten ook de profiteurs op de blaren zitten. Bouwbedrijven gaan failliet, makelaars zien hun verdiensten kelderen en gemeenten zitten met gigantische gaten in hun begroting nu ze hun bouwgrond niet kwijtraken. De banken voelen zich niet meer zo senang bij hun opgezwollen hypotheekportefeuilles en doen heel rustig aan met de kredietverlening aan huizenkopers. In vergelijking met de huizenmarktcrisis van de jaren tachtig lopen ze nu grotere risico's, omdat hypotheken nu gemiddeld veel hoger zijn en de potentiële restschulden dus ook.
  • Rutte stak in 2011 nog de loftrompet over dit fantastische bedenksel
  • © anp.
Politiek

Lang was het H-woord taboe voor politici van alle gezindten. Want niemand durfde de kiezer voor het hoofd te stoten.

Op lange termijn heeft  niemand belang bij hoge huizenprijzen. De rijksoverheid al helemaal niet. De kosten van de hypotheekrenteaftrek voor de schatkist zijn opgelopen van 660 miljoen euro in 1973 naar ruim 11 miljard euro per jaar nu. Vanaf medio jaren negentig is gewaarschuwd voor de perverse werking van de hypotheekrenteaftrek. De Nederlandsche Bank riep al in 2000 heel hard dat de aftrek zo snel mogelijk beperkt moest worden. Toch deed de politiek niets. Waarom niet?

Omdat politici opportunisten zijn die herkozen willen worden. De VVD verdedigde de aftrek omdat de achterban bestaat uit huiseigenaren met een bovenmodaal inkomen, de groep die er het meest van profiteert. Het CDA heeft de bevordering van het eigenwoningbezit op de politieke agenda gezet en de hypotheekrenteaftrek daarmee populair gemaakt. De socialisten, die begin jaren vijftig nog bedenkingen hadden, draaiden halverwege de jaren zeventig als een blad aan een boom om. In het regeerakkoord van het kabinet-Den Uyl uit 1973 stond nog dat er een studie moest komen naar de aftrekbare rente, omdat het volk zich te buiten ging aan 'overbesteding' met geleend geld. Voormalig staatssecretaris Martin van Rooijen (CDA) vertelde in een aflevering van Andere Tijden zelfgenoegzaam hoe hij premier Den Uyl ertoe overhaalde de hypotheekrenteaftrek desondanks in stand te houden. 'Hij had heel goed in de gaten dat die aftrek diende om het eigenwoningbezit te bevorderen, ook voor de gewone man.' Dit was net de tijd dat de huizenprijzen als een raket begonnen te stijgen. De arbeiders uit het PvdA-electoraat moesten ook de kans krijgen op de rijdende trein te springen en mee te profiteren van de makkelijke winsten die huiseigenaren opstreken.

Vanwege de snelle groei van het huizenbezit durfde daarna geen enkele partij het meer aan zo'n grote groep kiezers voor het hoofd te stoten. In 1980 bezat 43 procent van de kiezers een eigen woning. Tornen aan de hypotheekrenteaftrek werd als politieke zelfmoord beschouwd. Toen de PvdA-leden begin 1998 op een partijcongres een motie aannamen om de aftrek aan een maximum te binden, weigerde partijleider en premier Wim Kok botweg de motie uit te voeren. CDA-leider Balkenende maakte van het H-woord een breekpunt in de verkiezingscampagne van 2010 en VVD-leider Rutte stak in december 2011 nog de loftrompet over dit fantastische bedenksel. 'Ik zou de aftrek invoeren als hij er nog niet was.'

Dus is de hypotheekrenteaftrek pas aangepakt toen de wal het schip had gekeerd en het kalf verdronken was. Vaak wordt gezegd dat men het dak moet repareren als de zon schijnt. Negatieve maatregelen kunnen beter in goede tijden genomen worden, als de economie en de koopkracht wat kunnen lijden. Maar niemand ziet de noodzaak van een dakreparatie in zolang de zon schijnt. Dus wordt het dak pas gerepareerd als het is ingestort.
  • Huizen zijn echt om in te wonen,niet om er rijk mee te worden
  • © anp.
Consumenten

De huizenkoper schildert zichzelf graag af als slachtoffer. Maar hebzucht en kuddegedrag spelen een grote rol. 

Wat is dan de conclusie? Dat de huizenkoper het onschuldige slachtoffer is van politiek opportunisme en een snode financiële sector? Nee, dat is te gemakkelijk. Het zijn de huizenkopers wier gramschap de politici ervan weerhield de aftrek te beperken. En huizenkopers gingen maar al te gretig mee in de collectieve waan van eeuwig stijgende huizenprijzen. Consumenten wassen hun handen schoon met als argumenten: 1. 'Ik heb geen verstand van financiën en voer dus blind op mijn financieel adviseur', 2. 'Iedereen deed het en je werd voor gek verklaard als je niet meedeed' en 3. 'We moesten wel een hoge hypotheek nemen, want je moet toch ergens wonen.'

Het klakkeloos opvolgen van de adviezen van een financieel tussenpersoon, van wie je weet dat hij meer verdient als hij je een zo hoog mogelijke hypotheek aanpraat, mag een koper alleen zichzelf aanrekenen. Waarschijnlijk wilden veel consumenten de luchtkastelen die financieel adviseurs hun voorspiegelden maar al te graag geloven en vroegen ze daarom niet: 'Wat zijn de gevolgen als de beleggingsresultaten tegenvallen, de huizenprijzen dalen, of de hypotheekrente stijgt?'

De neiging gedachtenloos met de kudde mee te lopen komt voort uit ons oerinstinct ons aan te sluiten bij de groep, omdat dit in het stenen tijdperk onze overlevingskansen bepaalde. Hebzucht is ook een diepgewortelde menselijke eigenschap. Als de buurman, de zus en de collega een mooi en duur huis hebben, dan begeren de meeste mensen hetzelfde. 'Keeping up with the Joneses' heet dit economische fenomeen, waarbij de familie Jones model staat voor het gezin van de buurman.

Dat een koophuis een goede investering is, is ook al een misvatting. De Maastrichtse hoogleraar Piet Eichholtz heeft in een bekend onderzoek met zijn 'Herengracht-index' aangetoond dat over vele eeuwen gemeten de huizenprijzen slechts de inflatie volgen. Huizen zijn dus echt om in te wonen, niet om rijk mee te worden. Je verdient alleen geld aan je huis als je op het juiste moment instapt en op het juiste moment weer uitstapt. Net als op de beurs en net zo speculatief.

De speculatieve en consumptieve motieven van huizenkopers worden vaak weggeredeneerd. 'Wonen is een basisbehoefte en mensen moeten wel kopen omdat er geen huurwoningen zijn.' Helemaal waar, maar dat wil niet zeggen dat die andere motieven geen rol spelen.

Huizenkopers kunnen er immers ook voor kiezen een wat kleiner en goedkoper huis te kopen, zodat ze minder hoeven te lenen. Laag instappen spaart veel geld uit, want een hypotheek kost zelfs na fiscale aftrek minimaal het geleende bedrag aan rente en meestal meer. Maar huizenkopers willen dat grote en dure huis nú. En er moeten ook stante pede een nieuwe keuken en badkamer in. Daarom moeten ze wel een tophypotheek nemen. Maar dat is een keuze, geen noodzaak. In de jaren zeventig en negentig verzilverden honderdduizenden huiseigenaren hun overwaarde door hun hypotheek te verhogen. Het geld gaven ze uit aan de goede dingen des levens.

Omdat Nederlanders meestal hun maximale leencapaciteit benutten om een huis te kopen, worden de huizenprijzen hier zeer sterk bepaald door die leencapaciteit. Die wordt per 1 januari weer met tienduizenden euro's beperkt. Daarom kan het haast niet anders of de huizenprijzen zullen ook volgend jaar dalen. Alle optimistische voorspellingen ten spijt. Want met vertrouwen en optimisme kun je geen huis kopen, daar heb je toch echt klinkende munt voor nodig.

Yvonne Hofs is economieredacteur voor de Volkskrant.