donderdag 2 september 2021

Sackler family set to pay $4.5bn to settle opioid claims after judge approves plan

 Sackler family set to pay $4.5bn to settle opioid claims after judge approves plan

Conditional approval for plan to organize drugmaker into new company with board appointed by public officials

Wed 1 Sep 2021 22.33 BST

The settlement sets up a compensation fund that will pay some victims of drug addiction an expected $3,500 to $48,000 each. Photograph: Douglas Healey/A

A US federal bankruptcy judge on Wednesday conditionally approved a sweeping, potentially $10bn plan submitted by the OxyContin maker Purdue Pharma to settle a mountain of lawsuits over its role in the opioid crisis that has killed a half-million Americans over the past two decades.

Under the settlement reached with creditors including individual victims and thousands of state and local governments, the Sackler family will give up ownership of the company and contribute $4.5bn but will be freed from any future lawsuits over opioids.

The drugmaker will be reorganized into a new company with a board appointed by public officials and will funnel its profits into government-led efforts to prevent and treat opioid addiction.

Also, the settlement sets up a compensation fund that will pay some victims of drug addiction an expected $3,500 to $48,000 each.

US bankruptcy judge Robert Drain said on Wednesday he would approve the plan as long as two technical changes were made.

If so, he said, he will formally enter the decision on Thursday.

He said before his ruling that while he does not have “fondness for the Sacklers or sympathy for them”, collecting money from them through litigation would be complicated.

The settlement comes nearly two years after the Stamford, Connecticut-based company filed for bankruptcy under the weight of about 3,000 lawsuits from states, local governments, Native American tribes, hospitals, unions and other entities. They accuse Purdue Pharma of fueling the crisis by aggressively pushing sales of its bestselling prescription painkiller.

The Sacklers were not given immunity from criminal charges, though there have been no indications they will face any.

State and local governments came to support the plan overwhelmingly, though many did so grudgingly, as did groups representing those harmed by prescription opioids.

Nine states, Washington DC, Seattle and the US bankruptcy trustee, which seeks to protect the nation’s bankruptcy system, opposed the settlement, largely because of the protections granted to the Sackler family.

At least some of them were expected to appeal and the Washington state attorney general, Bob Ferguson, quickly announced he would appeal against the plan, calling it inadequate.

The bankruptcy judge, based in White Plains, New York, had urged the holdouts to negotiate an agreement, warning that drawn-out litigation would delay getting settlement money to victims and the programs needed to address the epidemic.

“Bitterness over the outcome of this case is completely understandable,” Drain said. “But one also has to look at the process and the issues and risks and rewards and alternatives of continued litigation versus the settlement laid out in the plan.”

He noted that the payout issue was mediated by Kenneth Feinberg, who oversaw the government’s September 11 Victim Compensation Fund.

Most states have sued Purdue, claiming it aggressively marketed OxyContin, contributing to an opioid overdose and addiction epidemic that has been linked to more than 500,000 deaths in the US.

Some of the deaths have been attributed to OxyContin and other prescription opioids, but most are from illicit forms of opioids such as heroin and illegally produced fentanyl. Opioid-linked deaths in the US continued at a record pace last year, hitting 70,000.

The crisis crushed the reputation of the Sackler family, major philanthropists whose name was once emblazoned on the walls of museums and universities around the world. With the settlement, family members who have owned the company will still be worth billions.

Whether the deal provides enough accountability for the Sacklers was the most contentious question through the proceedings. Many state attorneys general and advocacy groups working on behalf of opioid victims pushed for the family members to pay more and initially fought against the liability waiver.

They succeeded in boosting the amount the Sacklers would pay from a likely $3bn to a guaranteed $4.5bn over a decade.

David Sackler, a former Purdue board member, had testified that family members would not accept the agreement unless it protected them from lawsuits.

Otherwise, he said, the family would defend itself in litigation that could drag on for years, with the company’s and the family’s assets eaten up by lawyers’ fees rather than used to help address the crisis.

His father, Richard Sackler, a former Purdue president and board chairman, said under questioning that he, his family and the company did not bear responsibility for the opioid crisis.

Drain noted that none of the four Sacklers who testified offered an explicit apology. “A forced apology is not really an apology, so we will have to live without one,” he said.

The settlement also requires members of the Sackler family, who are scattered across the US, Britain and elsewhere in Europe, to get out of the opioid business worldwide.

Several attorneys general won another provision that will create a massive public repository of company documents, including communications with lawyers that normally would be protected by attorney-client privilege.

Purdue’s bankruptcy has been the highest-profile case in a complicated universe of opioid litigation.

Drugmaker Johnson & Johnson and the three largest US drug distribution companies recently announced a settlement that could be worth up to $26bn if state and local governments agree.

Individual trials also remain, including one scheduled to start in October in Cleveland over the role pharmacies played in the crisis. Other trials have been held this year in California, New York and West Virginia, though verdicts have not yet been reached.

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/01/purdue-pharma-sackler-family-settlement-judge-approves-opioid-crisis

zondag 29 augustus 2021

‘People wanted to believe’: reporter who exposed Theranos on Elizabeth Holmes’ trial

 

Elizabeth Holmes in 2015. Her company, Theranos, rose during the ‘unicorn boom’ of the time, John Carreyrou said. Photograph: CNBC/NBCU Photo Bank via Getty Images


As blood testing startup founder’s fraud trial looms, John Carreyrou says hero worship is still a problem in Silicon Valley

 in San Francisco

The unraveling of Theranos began with a 2015 article in the Wall Street Journal that revealed how the revolutionary technology promoted by the blood testing startup wasn’t exactly what it seemed.

Over the proceeding months, the reporter John Carreyrou exposed how the testing devices the Silicon Valley darling said could perform a variety of medical tests with just a drop of blood were not actually being used to perform most of the analyses. Investors and consumers, Carreyrou found, were being fooled.

Theranos dissolved in 2018 and its star founder, Elizabeth Holmes, will face trial in a San Jose courtroom next week.

Carreyrou’s book about the rise and fall of Theranos, meanwhile, became a bestseller and the author is hosting a new podcast, Bad Blood: the Final Chapter, as the trial begins.

He spoke with the Guardian about the lies Holmes pulled off and the larger questions about Silicon Valley culture that Theranos raised.

What do readers need to know about the particular moment in Silicon Valley culture when Theranos rose to prominence?

Theranos rose to prominence between 2013 and 2015, during the beginning of what I call the “unicorn boom” – Silicon Valley’s second enormous boom after the dotcom boom of the late 90s.

This boom started with the emergence of Facebook and Twitter and then metastasized with the appearance of these other big unicorns like Uber and Airbnb. Theranos at one point was worth even more and was the most valuable private startup in Silicon Valley back in 2014.

This was all before the backlash against big tech. People did not come down hard on Facebook until the 2016 election, when they realized the roles that Facebook and Twitter had played and the way those platforms were manipulated by Russian hackers. The disposition of the country and of the press towards Silicon Valley was still positive. When I broke the Theranos scandal, in a small way, it contributed to the backlash against tech that began to transpire.

Why do you think it was able to go unchecked for so long?

As Holmes herself has said, Theranos was in stealth mode in its first 10 years, so the company was not on anyone’s radar. It was really only in the limelight for two years before I wrote my first story on the scandal. You could argue that even that was too long because these unreliable and inaccurate blood tests were already available in Walgreens.

Sunny [Ramesh Balwani, former president of Theranos, who was also charged with fraud] and Elizabeth were very secretive – they managed that company like it was the CIA. The threat of litigation was always in the air, so employees were worried about speaking out.

It seems like the collection of high-profile people on the board, many of whom did not actually have scientific expertise, played into the hype. How was Holmes able to secure such supporters?

She very much did that in a calculated way. Early on, she started associating with these older men who could give her more credibility. It started out with Channing Robertson, the well-regarded Stanford engineering professor who would join her board, encouraging her and putting her in touch with people he knew around the Valley.

Then George Schultz was key in terms of being able to put together the last iteration of the board. He introduced her to all those luminaries; many of them were fellows at the Hoover Institution. And so she milked it. She was able to meet Gen Mattis, ex-cabinet members like Kissinger, and on and on.

The [Securities and Exchange Commission] has a term for this, and it’s affinity fraud. It’s associating yourself with people who are credible and well regarded by society to give yourself credibility. And that is a big part of the Theranos story.

Could you talk a little bit about the mythos surrounding Elizabeth Holmes and why people were attracted to that?

There are two parts to it. One is a myth that survives to this day, popularized by the incredible success of Steve Jobs, that Silicon Valley every few years can produce these young genius startup founders and that they can do no wrong.

[Holmes] served that myth, but there was also a gender component to it. She was going to be the first woman who reached billionaire status and join the pantheon of these tech leaders. People were really rooting for her – young girls were writing her letters.

A lot of people wanted to believe this fairytale, because it would have represented real progress in this very male-dominated world of Silicon Valley. Unfortunately, it was a fairytale that wasn’t true.

Ramesh ‘Sunny’ Balwani leaves court in San Jose, California, in 2019.
Ramesh ‘Sunny’ Balwani leaves court in San Jose, California, in 2019. Photograph: Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

Do you think that those myths around people or those personas still play a big role and who gets funding in Silicon Valley?

Yes, absolutely. To this day there is a willingness to worship geniuses in Silicon Valley. It is a very American phenomenon – I am half French and I think Europeans tend to be a little bit more cynical, but Americans are eternally optimistic, eternally willing to worship new heroes.

That is especially true in Silicon Valley, where there’s this magical thinking that some people are geniuses and just can’t be wrong. It may have been tempered in the past years because of Theranos, but I believe it still very much exists.

When you broke the story you were also based on the east coast – do you think coming from outside the bubble of Silicon Valley helped in your reporting?

That is part of it, but it’s also the fact that I’d been doing investigative reporting about healthcare for a decade before I stumbled on Theranos. Holmes framed herself as being part of a tech lineage when in fact her company was a healthcare company. So I had just the right background to see through it.

Given that the media played such a large role in building up the company, do you think tech media is doing any better now?

Especially after we learned the way Facebook and Twitter were exploited during the 2016 election and how these companies have become virtual monopolies, there’s a lot more skeptical and critical coverage nowadays than there was back then.

In terms of the culture of Silicon Valley itself changing, I still think it’s going to take a guilty verdict.

How do you think the outcome of the case will impact Silicon Valley and startup culture more broadly?

If she’s convicted and does significant prison time, it’s going to be a shot across the bow to venture capitalists and startup founders in the Valley that there are limits to how much bullshitting you can do, to how much exaggerating and hyping you can do and how many rules you can break.

There has long been a culture of faking it until you make it in Silicon Valley, and she is a product of that culture. To reform that, it is going to take a conviction and people realizing if you cross too many lines, you will end up in prison.

The flip side of that is that if she’s acquitted you’ll have young entrepreneurs running around Silicon Valley saying: “Yeah, I push the envelope but look at what Elizabeth Holmes got away with – she did worse than what I am doing and didn’t do a day in prison.”

Do you think she will testify?

If I had to bet, I think she will testify. Not just because of what I have said about her tolerance for risk and her confidence, but because it looks like her strategy is going to be to blame Sunny and say he was abusive.

If that is the strategy, I don’t think it will be enough to put psychologists on the stand. To convince the jurors, they will want to hear from her how Sunny abused her, what effect that had on her, and how it affected her judgment.

Maybe I will be proven wrong. In most criminal cases defense lawyers advise their clients not to testify because it is a huge gamble. It opens you up to cross-examination from the prosecution, which can backfire in a huge way. If she does testify, it will certainly go against the grain of what usually happens.

Given the defense that we’re kind of anticipating , what is your take on her relationship with Balwani?

He definitely was a bad influence - but the notion that he controlled her, to me, is laughable. They were in this together in a partnership of equals. If anything, when they disagreed, she had the final say.

I know this not only from the six years of reporting I have done on this, and all the people I have interviewed who saw them operate together up close, but I have perused five years of text messages between them that were exhibits in the SEC case [against Theranos].

You also have to remember the fact that she had 99.7% of the voting rights of this company. She was in full control. Was she living with him and were they consulting each other all the time? Yes. But I do not buy this notion that he was the puppeteer and she was the puppet.

This story has inspired a lot of movies, books and other media. Why do you think that it’s so compelling to people?

Scams are compelling in general, and US capitalism is really good at producing them.

In this case, people are fascinated with the psychology of Holmes. How did she rationalize behaving the way she did? How was she able to pull off these lies for so long? How was she able to manipulate people for so long? The way she deepened her voice at times, the clothes she wore – she is a real chameleon.

She’s also got this extraordinary tolerance for risk, because to pull off what she pulled off – going live with a blood testing device that didn’t work – that takes chutzpah. Even how she is handling the case now – most people would have pled out four years ago. She has chosen to take this trial to court, to roll the dice.

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/aug/28/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-trial-john-carreyrou