zaterdag 2 december 2023

Israel’s Spying on Palestinians Is So Pervasive It Would Shame Some Dictatorships

 



Israel’s Spying on Palestinians Is So Pervasive It Would Shame Some Dictatorships

EVERYWHERE ALL AT ONCE

The level of tech surveillance that Israel imposes on the Palestinian territories is both astounding and awful.

OPINION

Photo Illustration by Erin O’Flynn/The Daily Beast/Getty Images

Imagine walking the streets of your neighborhood when a group of fully armed soldiers stops you and demands to take photos of your face. Imagine trying to get out of the city for a day, but to leave, you need to cross a computerized checkpoint that scans your face to decide whether to let you through—while recording your every move. Imagine you’re a farmer, tending your sheep, when a foreign soldier shows up and takes a picture of your face. Once your picture loads on his phone, he treats you like a terrorist and detains you on the spot.

This is not a sequel to 1984, nor a nightmare episode of Black Mirror. This is the day-to-day life of a Palestinian in the occupied West Bank city of Hebron.

Amnesty International recently published “Automated Apartheid,” a report detailing Israel’s extensive use of digital and biometric surveillance technologies in the occupied Palestinian territories. The report uses Hebron and East Jerusalem as case studies through which to elaborate on the different systems Israel uses to surveil Palestinians.

One of the main revelations in the report is about a new, highly invasive surveillance system known as “Red Wolf,” which we at Breaking the Silence have recently heard about in testimonies we’ve received from soldiers who have used this technology.

1236459362

An Israeli soldier stands under a surveillance camera at a checkpoint in the flashpoint Palestinian city of Hebron on Nov. 9, 2021.

Hazem Bader/AFP via Getty Images

“Red Wolf” uses cameras installed at checkpoints and identifies Palestinians automatically using facial recognition software—without their knowledge, let alone consent—to instruct soldiers on how to treat them.

This latest revelation represents another facet of the facial recognition and mass surveillance systems employed in the city of Hebron, alongside “Blue Wolf,” a smartphone facial recognition app that matches photos of Palestinian civilians taken by soldiers with data we maintain in our database on each and every Palestinian resident of the occupied territories. Yet another surveillance system, known as “Hebron Smart City”—a network of highly invasive and sophisticated cameras which are spread throughout the city—makes it impossible for Palestinians in Hebron to escape the watchful eye of the occupation.

All these systems have significant implications on Palestinians’ basic human right to privacy. But perhaps even more significantly, they are also a means of control.

In the last 56 years, Israel’s military control over Palestinians has expanded extensively. In the name of “defense,” we carry out home demolitions, enable settler violence, violently disperse protests, and hold ourselves to extremely permissive standards in our rules of engagement.

As my IDF commander told me the last time I served in the occupied territories, these methods are used to “make sure the entire Palestinian population feels like they cannot lift their heads up.” Since then, our testifiers tell us this is still very much the norm.

Testimonies we collected from former soldiers, drawn upon in Amnesty’s new report, reveal what Palestinians have already known for years: that the Israeli security forces have an insatiable desire for their most private information. What these revelations demonstrate is how we are expanding our control over Palestinians beyond physical space and into the digital sphere.

A surveillance camera at a checkpoint in the flashpoint Palestinian city of Hebron on Nov. 9, 2021.

Hazem Bader/AFP via Getty Images

Today, not only do we control the cities, towns, and homes of Palestinians, we now also control their personal data. Palestinians’ biometric information is stored on Israeli databases, without their consent, with zero transparency, and most importantly—without their ability to exercise any political right within the regime which decided to collect their information in the first place.

A Palestinian living under Israeli military control today walks around knowing that our military can not only invade their home whenever we want, we can now also track them wherever they are.

Surveillance has been a key feature of the occupation for many years. Specifically in Hebron, the largest Palestinian city in the West Bank and the only one with a big Israeli settlement presence in its city center, this technology is most prominent. Hebron has always been used as an “occupation lab” of sorts, where new practices and technologies are tried and tested before being rolled out in the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories and, in some cases, also in Israeli towns and cities.

If you ask Israeli authorities to justify all this, they will surely answer that these measures are necessary for “security reasons.” We’ve heard this answer a thousand times, in a thousand different contexts. It is exactly how Israel justifies every element of the occupation.

Most Israelis, unfortunately, have unquestioningly internalized this logic. Sometimes, the authorities will go to even further lengths, saying that surveillance systems amount to “efforts to improve the quality of life for the Palestinian population.” In other words, our total control over every element of the lives of the people we hold under military dictatorship—including storing their biometric data—is for their own good.

“In the name of ‘defense,’ we carry out home demolitions, enable settler violence, violently disperse protests, and hold ourselves to extremely permissive standards in our rules of engagement.”

But “security” doesn’t justify the extreme extent to which these systems are deployed on the Palestinian population; after all, they are used on everyone, from children to the elderly, regardless of “security considerations.” We monitor peace activists, just as we monitor Palestinians active in violent resistance.

Crucially, these systems are not operating in a democratic capacity—there are no checks and balances, no regulations designed to protect the population, no protection from arbitrary or targeted abuse. As with everything else in the world of military occupation, what the commander says, goes.

Israeli soldiers walk past surveillance cameras in the flashpoint Palestinian city of Hebron on November 9, 2021.

HAZEM BADER/AFP via Getty Images

We, as Israeli citizens, in whose name these human rights violations are being carried out, need to do everything in our power to end these practices.

But it’s not our problem alone. As portrayed in the report, this is an international effort. Companies from around the world who are responsible for developing this technology are working hand in hand with Israeli state agencies and the Israeli army in order to control Palestinians in ways that would shame some of the world’s most vicious dictatorships. The “occupation lab” works in the international community’s interest, too: technology that is tried and tested here can very easily end up in other places.

Meanwhile in Israel, hundreds of thousands of Israelis are protesting every week under the slogan “resisting dictatorship,” referring to the judicial overhaul Netanyahu and his government are trying to pass. We must seize this opportunity not only to fight for our own rights as Israeli Jews, but to talk about the dictatorship we’ve already been enforcing for years—the one in which we hold millions of Palestinians under our military control and surveil their every move.

Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago

 



Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago

A blueprint reviewed by The Times laid out the attack in detail. Israeli officials dismissed it as aspirational and ignored specific warnings.

Several men holding rifles sit and ride in an olive green military vehicle driving down a dusty road.
Hamas-led gunmen seized an Israeli military vehicle after infiltrating areas of southern Israel during the Oct. 7 attacks. A blueprint for similar attacks was circulating among Israeli leaders long before Hamas struck.
Credit...
Ahmed Zakot/Reuters
Several men holding rifles sit and ride in an olive green military vehicle driving down a dusty road.

Reporting from Tel Aviv

Israeli officials obtained Hamas’s battle plan for the Oct. 7 terrorist attack more than a year before it happened, documents, emails and interviews show. But Israeli military and intelligence officials dismissed the plan as aspirational, considering it too difficult for Hamas to carry out.

The approximately 40-page document, which the Israeli authorities code-named “Jericho Wall,” outlined, point by point, exactly the kind of devastating invasion that led to the deaths of about 1,200 people.

The translated document, which was reviewed by The New York Times, did not set a date for the attack, but described a methodical assault designed to overwhelm the fortifications around the Gaza Strip, take over Israeli cities and storm key military bases, including a division headquarters.

Hamas followed the blueprint with shocking precision. The document called for a barrage of rockets at the outset of the attack, drones to knock out the security cameras and automated machine guns along the border, and gunmen to pour into Israel en masse in paragliders, on motorcycles and on foot — all of which happened on Oct. 7.

The plan also included details about the location and size of Israeli military forces, communication hubs and other sensitive information, raising questions about how Hamas gathered its intelligence and whether there were leaks inside the Israeli security establishment.

The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.

Image
A woman runs down a dirt path, as a plume of dark smoke can be seen on the horizon.
A woman running to the concrete shelter at her home in Ashkelon, Israel, after a rocket siren sounded on Oct. 7.
Credit...
Tamir Kalifa for The New York Times
A woman runs down a dirt path, as a plume of dark smoke can be seen on the horizon.

Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.

“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.

Then, in July, just three months before the attacks, a veteran analyst with Unit 8200, Israel’s signals intelligence agency, warned that Hamas had conducted an intense, daylong training exercise that appeared similar to what was outlined in the blueprint.

But a colonel in the Gaza division brushed off her concerns, according to encrypted emails viewed by The Times.

“I utterly refute that the scenario is imaginary,” the analyst wrote in the email exchanges. The Hamas training exercise, she said, fully matched “the content of Jericho Wall.”

“It is a plan designed to start a war,” she added. “It’s not just a raid on a village.”

Officials privately concede that, had the military taken these warnings seriously and redirected significant reinforcements to the south, where Hamas attacked, Israel could have blunted the attacks or possibly even prevented them.

Image
Armed soldiers kneeling near a truck.
Israeli soldiers were deployed in an area where civilians were killed in the southern city of Sderot on Oct. 7.
Credit...
Oren Ziv/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Armed soldiers kneeling near a truck.

Instead, the Israeli military was unprepared as terrorists streamed out of the Gaza Strip. It was the deadliest day in Israel’s history.

Israeli security officials have already acknowledged that they failed to protect the country, and the government is expected to assemble a commission to study the events leading up to the attacks. The Jericho Wall document lays bare a yearslong cascade of missteps that culminated in what officials now regard as the worst Israeli intelligence failure since the surprise attack that led to the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

Underpinning all these failures was a single, fatally inaccurate belief that Hamas lacked the capability to attack and would not dare to do so. That belief was so ingrained in the Israeli government, officials said, that they disregarded growing evidence to the contrary.

The Israeli military and the Israeli Security Agency, which is in charge of counterterrorism in Gaza, declined to comment.

Officials would not say how they obtained the Jericho Wall document, but it was among several versions of attack plans collected over the years. A 2016 Defense Ministry memorandum viewed by The Times, for example, says, “Hamas intends to move the next confrontation into Israeli territory.”

Such an attack would most likely involve hostage-taking and “occupying an Israeli community (and perhaps even a number of communities),” the memo reads.

Image
An overhead shot of twin spirals of black smoke rising from burning vehicles on a street near homes.
Vehicles caught fire in Ashkelon, Israel, as rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7.
Credit...
Ilan Rosenberg/Reuters
An overhead shot of twin spirals of black smoke rising from burning vehicles on a street near homes.

The Jericho Wall document, named for the ancient fortifications in the modern-day West Bank, was even more explicit. It detailed rocket attacks to distract Israeli soldiers and send them hurrying into bunkers, and drones to disable the elaborate security measures along the border fence separating Israel and Gaza.

Hamas fighters would then break through 60 points in the wall, storming across the border into Israel. The document begins with a quote from the Quran: “Surprise them through the gate. If you do, you will certainly prevail.”

The same phrase has been widely used by Hamas in its videos and statements since Oct. 7.

One of the most important objectives outlined in the document was to overrun the Israeli military base in Re’im, which is home to the Gaza division responsible for protecting the region. Other bases that fell under the division’s command were also listed.

Hamas carried out that objective on Oct. 7, rampaging through Re’im and overrunning parts of the base.

The audacity of the blueprint, officials said, made it easy to underestimate. All militaries write plans that they never use, and Israeli officials assessed that, even if Hamas invaded, it might muster a force of a few dozen, not the hundreds who ultimately attacked.

Israel had also misread Hamas’s actions. The group had negotiated for permits to allow Palestinians to work in Israel, which Israeli officials took as a sign that Hamas was not looking for a war.

But Hamas had been drafting attack plans for many years, and Israeli officials had gotten hold of previous iterations of them. What could have been an intelligence coup turned into one of the worst miscalculations in Israel’s 75-year history.

Image
A barefoot person lies in the back of a white Toyota pickup as men surround it.
A truck reportedly transported a captured Israeli woman in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on Oct. 7.
Credit...
Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
A barefoot person lies in the back of a white Toyota pickup as men surround it.

In September 2016, the defense minister’s office compiled a top-secret memorandum based on a much earlier iteration of a Hamas attack plan. The memorandum, which was signed by the defense minister at the time, Avigdor Lieberman, said that an invasion and hostage-taking would “lead to severe damage to the consciousness and morale of the citizens of Israel.”

The memo, which was viewed by The Times, said that Hamas had purchased sophisticated weapons, GPS jammers and drones. It also said that Hamas had increased its fighting force to 27,000 people — having added 6,000 to its ranks in a two-year period. Hamas had hoped to reach 40,000 by 2020, the memo determined.

Last year, after Israel obtained the Jericho Wall document, the military’s Gaza division drafted its own intelligence assessment of this latest invasion plan.

Hamas had “decided to plan a new raid, unprecedented in its scope,” analysts wrote in the assessment reviewed by The Times. It said that Hamas intended to carry out a deception operation followed by a “large-scale maneuver” with the aim of overwhelming the division.

But the Gaza division referred to the plan as a “compass.” In other words, the division determined that Hamas knew where it wanted to go but had not arrived there yet.

On July 6, 2023, the veteran Unit 8200 analyst wrote to a group of other intelligence experts that dozens of Hamas commandos had recently conducted training exercises, with senior Hamas commanders observing.

The training included a dry run of shooting down Israeli aircraft and taking over a kibbutz and a military training base, killing all the cadets. During the exercise, Hamas fighters used the same phrase from the Quran that appeared at the top of the Jericho Wall attack plan, she wrote in the email exchanges viewed by The Times.

The analyst warned that the drill closely followed the Jericho Wall plan, and that Hamas was building the capacity to carry it out.

The colonel in the Gaza division applauded the analysis but said the exercise was part of a “totally imaginative” scenario, not an indication of Hamas’s ability to pull it off.

“In short, let’s wait patiently,” the colonel wrote.

Image
A soldier in a green uniform and carrying a rifle walks past two bodies covered with sheets on the ground.
An Israeli soldier in the southern city of Sderot near the bodies of Israelis killed by Palestinian gunmen who entered from the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7.
Credit...
Tsafrir Abayov/Associated Press
A soldier in a green uniform and carrying a rifle walks past two bodies covered with sheets on the ground.

The back-and-forth continued, with some colleagues supporting the analyst’s original conclusion. Soon, she invoked the lessons of the 1973 war, in which Syrian and Egyptian armies overran Israeli defenses. Israeli forces regrouped and repelled the invasion, but the intelligence failure has long served as a lesson for Israeli security officials.

“We already underwent a similar experience 50 years ago on the southern front in connection with a scenario that seemed imaginary, and history may repeat itself if we are not careful,” the analyst wrote to her colleagues.

While ominous, none of the emails predicted that war was imminent. Nor did the analyst challenge the conventional wisdom among Israeli intelligence officials that Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas, was not interested in war with Israel. But she correctly assessed that Hamas’s capabilities had drastically improved. The gap between the possible and the aspirational had narrowed significantly.

The failures to connect the dots echoed another analytical failure more than two decades ago, when the American authorities also had multiple indications that the terrorist group Al Qaeda was preparing an assault. The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were largely a failure of analysis and imagination, a government commission concluded.

“The Israeli intelligence failure on Oct. 7 is sounding more and more like our 9/11,” said Ted Singer, a recently retired senior C.I.A. official who worked extensively in the Middle East. “The failure will be a gap in analysis to paint a convincing picture to military and political leadership that Hamas had the intention to launch the attack when it did.”

Image
In the forefront, a breached metal fence on a muddle field near trees. In the distance, thin smoke rises above buildings.
The breached security fence in the village of Kfar Azza, Israel, three days after it was attacked by Hamas.
Credit...
Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times
In the forefront, a breached metal fence on a muddle field near trees. In the distance, thin smoke rises above buildings.

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman

Adam Goldman writes about the F.B.I. and national security. He has been a journalist for more than two decades. More about Adam Goldman

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 1, 2023, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Israelis Saw Plan For Hamas Atttack Over a Year AgoOrder Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe