zondag 6 september 2026

FACT SHEET: Who Are the Jews of Iran, and How Do They View the War?

 



FACT SHEET: Who Are the Jews of Iran, and How Do They View the War?

Homayoun Sameh, the Jewish representative in Iran’s parliament, speaking at a pro-Palestine event. (Photo Illustration: Palestine Chronicle)
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By Palestine Chronicle Staff  

A statement by Iran’s Jewish lawmaker highlights how Iranian Jewish identity challenges Israel’s claim to represent Jews worldwide.

Who Are the Jews of Iran?

A statement by Iran’s Jewish lawmaker following the reported Israeli assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has drawn renewed attention to one of the Middle East’s least discussed communities: the Jews of Iran.

Homayoun Sameh, the Jewish representative in Iran’s parliament (Majlis), reportedly expressed condolences and described the assassination as a tragedy affecting the Iranian nation as a whole. The statement reflected a position often articulated by Iranian Jewish leaders—that their identity is tied primarily to Iran, not to Israel.

In the context of the Israeli-US war on Iran, such responses underscore a reality frequently overlooked in political discourse: Jewish communities around the world do not necessarily share a single political identity.

The existence and continued presence of the Iranian Jewish community complicate the narrative—often promoted by Israeli officials—that Israel speaks on behalf of Jews everywhere.

To understand why, it is necessary to look more closely at the history, status, and identity of Iran’s Jews.

How Ancient Is the Jewish Presence in Iran?

The Jewish presence in Iran is among the oldest continuous Jewish communities in the world, with roots that historians trace back more than two millennia.

Over the centuries, Jewish communities developed in various parts of the Iranian plateau, including cities such as Hamadan, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tehran. These communities participated in trade, scholarship, and local cultural life across different Persian dynasties and empires.

Persian Jewish history is intertwined with the broader history of the region. Jewish communities lived under the Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sassanian empires, as well as under later Islamic dynasties that ruled the region.

The deep historical roots of Jews in Iran mean that the community is often described not simply as a diaspora population but as an indigenous part of Iran’s historical and cultural landscape.

Even as political systems changed, Jewish communities remained embedded in local societies, developing Persian-Jewish cultural traditions and religious institutions that endured for centuries.

How Many Jews Live in Iran Today?

Today, Iran’s Jewish population is relatively small but remains one of the largest in the Middle East outside Israel.

Most estimates place the number of Jews living in Iran at between 8,000 and 10,000 people. Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, however, the community was far larger, with estimates ranging from 80,000 to 100,000 Jews living in the country.

Political upheaval, economic changes, and regional tensions prompted many Iranian Jews to emigrate in the late twentieth century, particularly to the United States.

Despite this decline, a functioning Jewish communal life continues to exist in Iran.

Most members of the community live in Tehran, which hosts the largest concentration of Iranian Jews. Smaller communities remain in Shiraz and Isfahan, cities with long Jewish histories.

Synagogues, Jewish schools, and community organizations continue to operate, and Jewish religious practices are still observed publicly within the framework permitted by Iranian law.

What Is the Legal Status of Jews in Iran?

Judaism is formally recognized in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Alongside Christianity and Zoroastrianism, Judaism is listed as one of the country’s official religious minorities, meaning that Jewish citizens have legal recognition and limited protections under Iranian law.

One of the most notable provisions is the reserved seat in Iran’s parliament (Majlis) allocated to the Jewish community.

This seat is currently held by Homayoun Sameh, who represents Iranian Jews in the national legislature.

Jewish religious institutions—including synagogues and community centers—operate in several Iranian cities, and Jewish schools continue to function, although they must follow the national education system and curriculum.

Like other religious minorities in Iran, Jews face certain restrictions, including limitations on holding some senior government or military positions. Nevertheless, the constitutional recognition of Judaism reflects an official distinction made by the Iranian state between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a political ideology.

Do Iranian Jews Identify with Israel?

The relationship between Iranian Jews and Israel is complex and often misunderstood outside the region.

Israel frequently portrays itself as the political representative of Jews worldwide. Yet many Jewish communities across the globe maintain identities shaped primarily by national, cultural, or historical ties to their own societies.

Iranian Jews historically developed a strong sense of belonging to Iran itself.

Community leaders have often emphasized that Judaism is a religion while Zionism is a political movement, and that the two should not be conflated.

This distinction is frequently highlighted in public statements by Iranian Jewish representatives and religious leaders, particularly during periods of heightened tension between Iran and Israel.

For many Iranian Jews, their identity is rooted not only in religious tradition but also in the Persian language, culture, and national history.

How Did the Community React to the Assassination of Khamenei?

Following the Israeli assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, statements attributed to representatives of Iran’s Jewish community expressed condolences and solidarity with the Iranian nation.

The reaction reflects a pattern that has appeared in several previous political crises in Iran: Jewish leaders publicly emphasizing their belonging to the country and their participation in national mourning or political discourse.

Such responses highlight the extent to which the Iranian Jewish community sees itself as part of the broader Iranian society rather than as an extension of Israel.

For observers outside Iran, these reactions can appear surprising. Yet within the context of Iranian Jewish history, expressions of national solidarity are consistent with the community’s long-standing self-identification as Iranian.

What Does the Iranian Jewish Experience Reveal?

The existence of a Jewish community in Iran complicates a simplified narrative often presented in international politics—that Israel speaks for Jews everywhere.

Jewish communities around the world are diverse in their political views, historical experiences, and national identities.

The Iranian case demonstrates how Jewish identity can coexist with strong local and national affiliations outside Israel.

For more than two millennia, Jews in Iran have lived within Persian society, adapting to changing political systems while preserving religious and cultural traditions.

Today, despite geopolitical tensions between Tehran and Tel Aviv, that ancient community continues to exist.

Its history underscores a broader reality: Jewish identity has never been monolithic, and communities across the world have developed their own relationships with the countries they call home.

For the Jews of Iran, that home has long been Iran itself.

(The Palestine Chronicle)

https://www.palestinechronicle.com/fact-sheet-who-are-the-jews-of-iran/

Omer Bartov: I’m a genocide scholar – I know it when I see it

 



Omer Bartov: I’m a genocide scholar –
I know it when I see it

Omer Bartov

The New York Times  /  July 15, 2025

A month after the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, I believed there was evidence that the Israeli military had committed war crimes and potentially crimes against humanity in its counterattack on Gaza. But contrary to the cries of Israel’s fiercest critics, the evidence did not seem to me to rise to the crime of genocide.

By May 2024, the Israel Defense Forces had ordered about one million Palestinians sheltering in Rafah — the southernmost and last remaining relatively undamaged city of the Gaza Strip — to move to the beach area of the Mawasi, where there was little to no shelter. The army then proceeded to destroy much of Rafah, a feat mostly accomplished by August.

At that point it appeared no longer possible to deny that the pattern of I.D.F. operations was consistent with the statements denoting genocidal intent made by Israeli leaders in the days after the Hamas attack. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had promised that the enemy would pay a “huge price” for the attack and that the I.D.F. would turn parts of Gaza, where Hamas was operating, “into rubble,” and he called on “the residents of Gaza” to “leave now because we will operate forcefully everywhere.”

Mr. Netanyahu had urged his citizens to remember “what Amalek did to you,” a quote many interpreted as a reference to the demand in a biblical passage calling for the Israelites to “kill alike men and women, infants and sucklings” of their ancient enemy. Government and military officials said they were fighting “human animals” and, later, called for “total annihilation.” Nissim Vaturi, the deputy speaker of Parliament, said on X that Israel’s task must be “erasing the Gaza Strip from the face of the earth.” Israel’s actions could be understood only as the implementation of the expressed intent to make the Gaza Strip uninhabitable for its Palestinian population. I believe the goal was — and remains today — to force the population to leave the Strip altogether or, considering that it has nowhere to go, to debilitate the enclave through bombings and severe deprivation of food, clean water, sanitation and medical aid to such an extent that it is impossible for Palestinians in Gaza to maintain or reconstitute their existence as a group.

My inescapable conclusion has become that Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinian people. Having grown up in a Zionist home, lived the first half of my life in Israel, served in the I.D.F. as a soldier and officer and spent most of my career researching and writing on war crimes and the Holocaust, this was a painful conclusion to reach, and one that I resisted as long as I could. But I have been teaching classes on genocide for a quarter of a century. I can recognize one when I see one.

This is not just my conclusion. A growing number of experts in genocide studies and international law have concluded that Israel’s actions in Gaza can only be defined as genocide. So has Francesca Albanese, the U.N. special rapporteur for the West Bank and Gaza, and Amnesty International. South Africa has brought a genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

The continued denial of this designation by states, international organizations and legal and scholarly experts will cause unmitigated damage not just to the people of Gaza and Israel but also to the system of international law established in the wake of the horrors of the Holocaust, designed to prevent such atrocities from happening ever again. It is a threat to the very foundations of the moral order on which we all depend.

The crime of genocide was defined in 1948 by the United Nations as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” In determining what constitutes genocide, therefore, we must both establish intent and show that it is being carried out. In Israel’s case, that intent has been publicly expressed by numerous officials and leaders. But intent can also be derived from a pattern of operations on the ground, and this pattern became clear by May 2024 — and has since become ever clearer — as the I.D.F. has systematically destroyed the Gaza Strip.

Most genocide scholars are cautious about applying this term to contemporary events, precisely because of the tendency, since it was coined by the Jewish-Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944, to attribute it to any case of massacre or inhumanity. Indeed, some argue that the categorization should be entirely discarded, because it often serves more to express outrage than to identify a particular crime.

Yet as Mr. Lemkin recognized, and as the United Nations later agreed, it is crucial to be able to distinguish the attempt to destroy a particular group of people from other crimes under international law, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is because, while other crimes entail indiscriminate or deliberate killing of civilians as individuals, genocide denotes the killing of people as members of a group, geared at irreparably destroying the group itself so that it would never be able to reconstitute itself as a political, social or cultural entity. And, as the international community signalled by adopting the convention, it is incumbent upon all signatory states to prevent such an attempt, to do all they can to stop it while it is occurring and to subsequently punish those who were engaged in this crime of crimes — even if it occurred within the borders of a sovereign state.

The designation has major political, legal and moral ramifications. Nations, politicians and military personnel suspected of, indicted on a charge of or found guilty of genocide are seen as beyond the pale of humanity and may compromise or lose their right to remain members of the international community. A finding by the International Court of Justice that a particular state is engaged in genocide, especially if enforced by the U.N. Security Council, can lead to severe sanctions.

Politicians or generals indicted on a charge of or found guilty of genocide or other breaches of international humanitarian law by the International Criminal Court can face arrest outside of their country. And a society that condones and is complicit in genocide, whatever the stand of its individual citizens may be, will carry this mark of Cain long after the fires of hatred and violence are put out.

Israel has denied all allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The I.D.F. says it investigates reports of crimes, although it has rarely made its findings public, and when breaches of discipline or protocol are acknowledged, it has generally meted out light reprimands to its personnel. Israeli military and political leaders repeatedly describe the I.D.F. as acting lawfully, say they issue warnings to civilian populations to evacuate sites about to be attacked and blame Hamas for using civilians as human shields.

In fact, the systematic destruction in Gaza not only of housing but also of other infrastructure — government buildings, hospitals, universities, schools, mosques, cultural heritage sites, water treatment plants, agriculture areas, and parks — reflects a policy aimed at making the revival of Palestinian life in the territory highly unlikely.

According to a recent investigation by Haaretz, an estimated 174,000 buildings have been destroyed or damaged, accounting for up to 70 percent of all structures in the Strip. So far, more than 58,000 people have been killed, according to Gazan health authorities, including more than 17,000 children, who make up nearly a third of the total fatality count. More than 870 of those children were less than a year old.

More than 2,000 families have been wiped out, the health authorities said. In addition, 5,600 families now count only one survivor. At least 10,000 people are believed to still be buried under the ruins of their homes. More than 138,000 have been wounded and maimed.

Gaza now has the grim distinction of having the highest number of amputee children per capita in the world. An entire generation of children subjected to ongoing military attacks, loss of parents and long-term malnutrition will suffer severe physical and mental repercussions for the rest of their lives. Untold additional thousands of chronically ill persons have had little access to hospital care.

The horror of what has been happening in Gaza is still described by most observers as war. But this is a misnomer. For the last year, the I.D.F. has not been fighting an organized military body. The version of Hamas that planned and carried out the attacks on Oct. 7 has been destroyed, though the weakened group continues to fight Israeli forces and retains control over the population in areas not held by the Israeli Army.

Today the I.D.F. is primarily engaged in an operation of demolition and ethnic cleansing. That’s how Mr. Netanyahu’s own former chief of staff and minister of defense, the hard-liner Moshe Yaalon, in November described on Israel’s Democrat TV and in subsequent articles and interviews the attempt to clear northern Gaza of its population.

On Jan. 19, under pressure from Donald Trump, who was a day away from resuming the presidency, a cease-fire went into effect, facilitating the exchange of hostages in Gaza for Palestinian prisoners in Israel. But after Israel’s breaking of the cease-fire on March 18, the I.D.F. has been executing a well-publicized plan to concentrate the entire Gazan population in a quarter of the territory in three zones: Gaza City, the central refugee camps and the Mawasi coastline in the Strip’s southwestern edge.

Using large numbers of bulldozers and huge aerial bombs supplied by the United States, the military appears to be trying to demolish every remaining structure and establish control over the other three-quarters of the territory.

This is also being facilitated by a plan that provides — intermittently — limited aid supplies at a few distribution points guarded by the Israeli military, drawing people to the south. Many Gazans are killed in a desperate attempt to obtain food, and the starvation crisis deepens. On July 7, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the I.D.F. would build a “humanitarian city” over the ruins of Rafah to initially accommodate 600,000 Palestinians from the Mawasi area, who would be provisioned by international bodies and not allowed to leave.

Some might describe this campaign as ethnic cleansing, not genocide. But there is a link between the crimes. When an ethnic group has nowhere to go and is constantly displaced from one so-called safe zone to another, relentlessly bombed and starved, ethnic cleansing can morph into genocide.

This was the case in several well-known genocides of the 20th century, such as that of the Herero and Nama in German South West Africa, now Namibia, that began in 1904; the Armenians in World War I; and, indeed, even in the Holocaust, which began with the German attempt to expel the Jews and ended up with their murder.

To this day, only a few scholars of the Holocaust — and no institutions dedicated to researching and commemorating it — have issued warnings that Israel could be accused of carrying out war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide. This silence has made a mockery of the slogan “Never again,” transforming its meaning from an assertion of resistance to inhumanity wherever it is perpetrated to an excuse, an apology, indeed, even a carte blanche for destroying others by invoking one’s own past victimhood.

This is another of the many incalculable costs of the current catastrophe. As Israel is literally trying to wipe out Palestinian existence in Gaza and is exercising increasing violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, the moral and historical credit that the Jewish state has drawn on until now is running out.

Israel, created in the wake of the Holocaust as the answer to the Nazi genocide of the Jews, has always insisted that any threat to its security must be seen as potentially leading to another Auschwitz. This provides Israel with license to portray those it perceives as its enemies as Nazis — a term used repeatedly by Israeli media figures to depict Hamas and, by extension, all Gazans, based on the popular assertion that none of them are “uninvolved,” not even the infants, who would grow up to be militants.

This is not a new phenomenon. As early as Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Prime Minister Menachem Begin compared Yasir Arafat, then hunkered down in Beirut, to Adolf Hitler in his Berlin bunker. This time, the analogy is being used in connection with a policy aimed at uprooting and removing the entire population of Gaza.

The daily scenes of horror in Gaza, from which the Israeli public is shielded by its own media’s self-censorship, expose the lies of Israeli propaganda that this is a war of defense against a Nazi-like enemy. One shudders when Israeli spokespeople shamelessly utter the hollow slogan of the I.D.F. being the “most moral army in the world.”

Some European nations, such as France, Britain and Germany, as well as Canada, have feebly protested Israeli actions, especially since it breached the cease-fire in March. But they have neither suspended arms shipments nor taken many concrete and meaningful economic or political steps that might deter Mr. Netanyahu’s government.

For a while, the United States government seemed to have lost interest in Gaza, with President Trump initially announcing in February that the United States would take over Gaza, promising to turn it into “the Riviera of the Middle East,” and then letting Israel get on with the Strip’s destruction and turning his attention to Iran. At the moment, one can only hope that Mr. Trump will again pressure a reluctant Mr. Netanyahu to at least reach a new cease-fire and put an end to the relentless killing.

How will Israel’s future be affected by the inevitable demolition of its incontestable morality, derived from its birth in the ashes of the Holocaust?

Israel’s political leadership and its citizenry will have to decide. There seems to be little domestic pressure for the urgently needed change of paradigm: the recognition that there is no solution to this conflict other than an Israeli-Palestinian agreement to share the land under whatever parameters the two sides agree on, be it two states, one state or a confederation. Robust external pressure from the country’s allies also appears unlikely. I am deeply worried that Israel will persist on its disastrous course, remaking itself, perhaps irreversibly, into a full-blown authoritarian apartheid state. Such states, as history has taught us, do not last.

Another question arises: What consequences will Israel’s moral reversal have for the culture of Holocaust commemoration, and the politics of memory, education and scholarship, when so many of its intellectual and administrative leaders have up to now refused to face up to their responsibility to denounce inhumanity and genocide wherever they occur?

Those engaged in the worldwide culture of commemoration and remembrance built around the Holocaust will have to confront a moral reckoning. The wider community of genocide scholars — those engaged in the study of comparative genocide or of any one of the many other genocides that have marred human history — is now edging ever closer toward a consensus over describing events in Gaza as a genocide.

In November, a little more than a year into the war, the Israeli genocide scholar Shmuel Lederman joined the growing chorus of opinion that Israel was engaged in genocidal actions. The Canadian international lawyer William Schabas came to the same conclusion last year and has recently described Israel’s military campaign in Gaza as “absolutely” a genocide.

Other genocide experts, such as Melanie O’Brien, president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, and the British specialist Martin Shaw (who has also said that the Hamas attack was genocidal), have reached the same conclusion, while the Australian scholar A. Dirk Moses of the City University of New York described these events in the Dutch publication NRC as a “mix of genocidal and military logic.” In the same article, UÄŸur Ümit Üngör, a professor at the Amsterdam-based NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, said there are probably scholars who still do not think it’s genocide, but “I don’t know them.”

Most Holocaust scholars I know don’t hold, or at least publicly express, this view. With a few notable exceptions, such as the Israeli Raz Segal, program director of Holocaust and genocide studies at Stockton University in New Jersey, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem historians Amos Goldberg and Daniel Blatman, the majority of academics engaged with the history of the Nazi genocide of the Jews have stayed remarkably silent, while some have openly denied Israel’s crimes in Gaza, or accused their more critical colleagues of incendiary speech, wild exaggeration, well poisoning and antisemitism.

In December the Holocaust scholar Norman J.W. Goda opined that “genocide charges like this have long been used as a fig leaf for broader challenges to Israel’s legitimacy,” expressing his worry that “they have cheapened the gravity of the word genocide itself.” This “genocide libel,” as Dr. Goda referred to it in an essay, “deploys a range of antisemitic tropes,” including “the coupling of the genocide charge with the deliberate killing of children, images of whom are ubiquitous on NGO, social media, and other platforms that charge Israel with genocide.”

In other words, showing images of Palestinian children ripped apart by U.S.-made bombs launched by Israeli pilots is, in this view, an antisemitic act.

Most recently, Dr. Goda and a respected historian of Europe, Jeffrey Herf, wrote in The Washington Post that “the genocide accusation hurled against Israel draws on deep wells of fear and hatred” found in “radical interpretations of both Christianity and Islam.” It “has shifted opprobrium from Jews as a religious/ethnic group to the state of Israel, which it depicts as inherently evil.”

What are the ramifications of this rift between genocide scholars and Holocaust historians? This is not merely a squabble within academe. The memory culture created in recent decades around the Holocaust encompasses much more than the genocide of the Jews. It has come to play a crucial role in politics, education and identity.

Museums dedicated to the Holocaust have served as models for representations of other genocides around the world. Insistence that the lessons of the Holocaust demand the promotion of tolerance, diversity, antiracism and support for migrants and refugees, not to mention human rights and international humanitarian law, is rooted in an understanding of the universal implications of this crime in the heart of Western civilization at the peak of modernity.

Discrediting genocide scholars who call out Israel’s genocide in Gaza as antisemitic threatens to erode the foundation of genocide studies: the ongoing need to define, prevent, punish and reconstruct the history of genocide. Suggesting that this endeavour is motivated instead by malign interests and sentiments — that it is driven by the very hatred and prejudice that was at the root of the Holocaust — is not only morally scandalous, it provides an opening for a politics of denialism and impunity as well.

By the same token, when those who have dedicated their careers to teaching and commemorating the Holocaust insist on ignoring or denying Israel’s genocidal actions in Gaza, they threaten to undermine everything that Holocaust scholarship and commemoration have stood for in the past several decades. That is, the dignity of every human being, respect for the rule of law and the urgent need never to let inhumanity take over the hearts of people and steer the actions of nations in the name of security, national interest and sheer vengeance.

What I fear is that in the aftermath of the Gaza genocide, it will no longer be possible to continue teaching and researching the Holocaust in the same manner we did before. Because the Holocaust has been so relentlessly invoked by the state of Israel and its defenders as a cover-up for the crimes of the I.D.F., the study and remembrance of the Holocaust could lose its claim to be concerned with universal justice and retreat into the same ethnic ghetto in which it began its life at the end of World War II — as a marginalized preoccupation by the remnants of a marginalized people, an ethnically specific event, before it succeeded, decades later, to find its rightful place as a lesson and a warning for humanity as a whole.

Just as worrisome is the prospect that the study of genocide as a whole will not survive the accusations of antisemitism, leaving us without the crucial community of scholars and international jurists to stand in the breach at a time when the rise of intolerance, racial hatred, populism and authoritarianism is threatening the values that were at the core of these scholarly, cultural and political endeavours of the 20th century.

Perhaps the only light at the end of this very dark tunnel is the possibility that a new generation of Israelis will face their future without sheltering in the shadow of the Holocaust, even as they will have to bear the stain of the genocide in Gaza perpetrated in their name. Israel will have to learn to live without falling back on the Holocaust as justification for inhumanity. That, despite all the horrific suffering we are currently watching, is a valuable thing, and may, in the long run, help Israel face the future in a healthier, more rational and less fearful and violent manner.

This will do nothing to compensate for the staggering amount of death and suffering of Palestinians. But an Israel liberated from the overwhelming burden of the Holocaust may finally come to terms with the inescapable need for its seven million Jewish citizens to share the land with the seven million Palestinians living in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank in peace, equality and dignity. That will be the only just reckoning.

Omer Bartov is a professor of Holocaust and genocide studies at Brown University

https://palestina-komitee.nl/omer-bartov-im-a-genocide-scholar-i-know-it-when-i-see-it/

The Israel Lobby Is Out of Control

 

Interview by
Seth Ackerman
I
n a year of record-breaking campaign spending by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and widespread popular revulsion at Donald Trump’s war on Iran, a deeply researched study of the Israel lobby couldn’t be timelier. Jacobin’s Seth Ackerman spoke with investigative journalist Eli Clifton and veteran scholar Ian Lustick about their new book Israel’s Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power, which reveals how the lobby has not only warped Washington politics but accelerated Israel’s own ideological radicalization — and now threatens Americans’ civil liberties at home.

Seth Ackerman
Almost twenty years ago, the international relations scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt wrote a very famous and very controversial book called The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Your book is in many ways a sequel to theirs. What made you decide the time was right for a book like this?
Eli Clifton
A lot has changed since 2007. Steve Walt and John Mearsheimer identified some of the global strategic costs that the lobby’s activities were imposing on Americans, and those have continued to amplify and magnify. But some of the other costs are more domestic in nature, and those were enabled by changes in our laws, which Steve and John could not have foreseen.
In their book’s conclusion, they argued that support for a “no daylight” relationship with Israel was slowly seeping away. They identified that trend as having begun around 1999 or 2000, with the death of the Oslo Accords and the closing of the window on the two-state solution. And they predicted that that slow decline would be met by the rise of other institutions — such as J Street, Jewish Voice for Peace, and others — that would be able to advocate for a more normal and balanced US-Israel relationship and make it possible to wean US politics off the influence of the lobby.
But in 2010, the Citizens United and SpeechNow decisions came down. That opened the floodgates of our campaign finance system. Starting in 2012, which was the first post–Citizens United election, when you look at who the biggest donors were, it was Sheldon Adelson and other pro-Israel billionaire megadonors. And they said very explicitly that they were doing this for Israel.
So in the face of declining public support for Israel — which really accelerated post–October 7 across pretty much every demographic — that allowed them to create a stopgap.
Alongside the money, there was also a strategic shift. The lobby stopped trying to counter arguments like those of Mearsheimer and Walt. Instead they moved to completely shut down debate, including by using the power of the state to shut down speech critical of Israel. We saw that with the withholding of hundreds of millions of dollars of federal funding from universities, often in research areas that have nothing to do with Israel or Palestine. Or in the attempts to deport green card holders simply because of their criticisms of a foreign country.
So we’re now paying a domestic price in terms of our own civil liberties. That’s a key part of what has changed since their book came out.
Seth Ackerman
One of the arguments made by Mearsheimer and Walt twenty years ago was that the end of the Cold War eliminated the major rationale that had once been used to justify Israel’s privileged relationship with the United States. Would you say that the lobby then tried to turn Iran into the new Soviet Union — the new enemy that would make Israel indispensable to the United States?
Ian Lustick
Israel did present itself as a crucial ally against Soviet penetration of the Middle East, though that claim was never very convincing to experts. In the book, we report a fascinating natural experiment that proved how empty the claim was. In 1991, one of the leading international relations analysts, A. F. K. Organski, a University of Michigan professor, published a book called The $36 Billion Bargain, which argued that Israel was like a land-based aircraft carrier: it was so useful to the United States in its struggle against the Soviet Union that all the aid we gave to it was a bargain.
And as part of his argument, he asked: How can we know this is true? Well, if the Soviet Union were to disappear and the Cold War were to end, we would see the aid drop. Now that’s exactly what happened right after his book was published. The Soviet Union disintegrated, and the Cold War ended. And what happened to aid to Israel? Absolutely nothing. It continued at exactly the same level. Which showed that aid to Israel was not a function of American strategic calculations. It was overwhelmingly a function of the domestic political power of Israel’s lobby in the United States.
But the argument that Israel served US strategic interests was important to both Israel and its lobby. After the end of the Cold War, both needed a domain within which it could present itself as a crucial ally of the United States. Accordingly, during the global war on terror (GWOT), Israeli leaders said that their wars against Hezbollah or against the Palestinians in the West Bank were part of the US-led war on terror. But then the GWOT ended, and another domain was needed for Israel to present itself as America’s crucial ally.
Benjamin Netanyahu chose Iran to play the role of mortal enemy of both Israel and the United States, replacing the war on terror, which had replaced the Soviet Union. But Netanyahu actually had great difficulty fomenting the combined US-Israeli attack on Iran that he wanted.
Israel’s own security establishment opposed him, arguing that no, Iran was never going to attack Israel with a nuclear weapon. He also ran into a series of American presidents who all thought attacking Iran was a wacky idea. His demands for a war were successfully resisted until in Trump he found a president stupid enough — and a national security bureaucracy so drained of expertise and so incompetent — that he was able to essentially drag the United States into a war with Iran, a war which even Trump now probably thinks was a terrible mistake.
But there’s a deeper reason why Netanyahu, Israel’s longest serving prime minister, has been on the warpath against Iran, Gaza, Syria, Lebanon — and why lately he’s been ginning up a crisis with Turkey. The deep reason for such a bellicose posture is that his governments have been unable to articulate a vision of peace in the Middle East that anybody in the region would be satisfied with. And since they don’t have any vision of peace, they have to rely completely on their ability to use military force at almost no risk, whether that’s in Lebanon or Iraq or Syria or Gaza or Iran. The other day we saw the Israeli Air Force bomb a base in Syria — not because there was a threat, but because there was potentially a threat, from Turkey or from the Syrian military.
That is emblematic of the situation Israel has created for itself. If it can’t rely on diplomacy or negotiated compromises, it must rely on military force. But to rely on military force, it must be confident it can use that force without risk of significant casualties, or of escalation to the use of weapons of mass destruction. It therefore, in effect, insists on absolute air superiority and domination over the entire Middle East. And it has to insist that only it be permitted to have weapons of mass destruction. These are enormous demands. Remember, Iran is geographically bigger than Britain, France, and Germany combined.
The threat from Iran is not that it will attack Israel with nuclear weapons. It’s that if there’s even a 1 percent possibility that Iran could escalate to the nuclear level, Israel would no longer be able to use force in the region without fearing escalation. That’s intolerable if you have no plan for peace, which the Netanyahu government has never had. That’s the deeper reason he’s focused so much on Iran and relies so heavily on military force.
Seth Ackerman
In your book, you argue that this strategic predicament is itself partly the result of the lobby’s power in the United States.
Ian Lustick
Yes. Originally, the lobby was only there to prevent pressure on Israel; it wasn’t out to change Israel, to make it into this fanatical right-wing state. But by insisting that aid to Israel be enormous in scope and unconditional in its delivery, the lobby made it essentially impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for moderate candidates to win elections in Israel. Because everything they said about what would happen if Israel alienated the United States — that it would pressure Israel into a deal worse than it could get if it adopted a reasonable position before that pressure — turned out to be false.
This is what happens to a country that has too much externally supplied political capital. If you were a politician in Israel, you learned that you had to pander to people’s fantasies and fears, and there was no real cost to it. But there was a tremendous cost to talking rationally about the predicament Israel would eventually find itself in.
I can list all these wonderful Israeli politicians — Shulamit Aloni, Haim Ramon, Yossi Sarid, Yossi Beilin — all of these people who could have been prime minister, and wanted to be prime minister but didn’t succeed, and couldn’t succeed, because of the lobby’s hammerlock on US policy toward Israel and the Palestinians.
Seth Ackerman
In other words, many Israelis used to assume that if push ever came to shove, America would save Israel from itself by stepping in and restraining it.
Ian Lustick
Yes. And that was specifically the problem with Joe Biden. He didn’t play the role the Israeli military always expects the United States to play.
When Time magazine interviewed me early in the Gaza war, they asked: When will the war end? I said, “I can tell you exactly when it will end. It’s the same as in every war. It will end when the United States tells Israel it has to end. Until that happens, the war will continue.” And Biden just wouldn’t say it. Trump more or less said it and it stopped (or at least, a certain version of war stopped). But it went on for years — far, far longer than it ever should have. It was ridiculous. The Israeli military never imagined that an American president would allow it to run so wild for so long.
Seth Ackerman
What about the liberal part of the American pro-Israel establishment? They seem to be in a pretty complicated political situation right now. Do you think they’ve figured out a way forward?
Eli Clifton
One thing you see them doing is clinging, in a rather desperate, disingenuous way, to the fig leaf of a notion that the Israel they would like to be associated with somehow still exists, or is right around the corner. So if Netanyahu is removed, somehow this rightward shift will come to an end and Israel will go back to being like what it was, I guess, pre-1967.
When push comes to shove, politicians across the Democratic Party say: “I believe in a two-state solution.” And that’s a dangerous thing for them to be saying because it’s simply not rooted in any facts on the ground. The window has closed for that possibility, as desirable as it might have been.
So I think the way a lot of them are coping with it, to put it pretty bluntly, is through delusion, and through misrepresenting to their constituents what is possible and what the facts are on the ground.
Ian Lustick
Let me push that a little further. I published a book on this in 2019, Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality. Even then it had long since been impossible to imagine political scenarios by which a two-state solution could be achieved. Those stopped being produced in the 1990s when Oslo ended. But it’s been a safe political harbor to claim that a negotiated two-state arrangement is still possible.
It’s been safe for Israeli centrists who don’t want to admit they prefer apartheid to democracy. And it’s been safe for Democratic and other politicians in the United States, who are able to say: “I’m for a two-state solution. Don’t blame me, progressives.” And meanwhile they can also say to the lobby: “Don’t criticize me — even Netanyahu once said he was for a two-state solution.” As Eli said, it’s a fig leaf.
So where is the future? I would say you have to change the time frame of your analysis. Back when we used to think of a two-state solution as being plausible, we were thinking in what I call strategic time. Strategic time is like two to five years, the time frame when you actually might accomplish something in this kind of arena. We have to shift from strategic time to geological time. Geological time in politics is like thirty to sixty years.
How does a country like Israel democratize? It’s not the same as how Romania democratized: you shoot the dictator, and the next day, it’s a democracy. That’s not how democratization works in cases like, say, America when blacks were for generations excluded from politics, or Irish Catholics in Britain, or blacks in South Africa, or women in all western industrial democracies. That kind of democratization takes fifty to a hundred years.
Seth Ackerman
But isn’t there a danger that, in adopting that frame, you inadvertently give apologists for the status quo an excuse to do nothing? If progress can only happen in geological time, what’s the urgency of doing anything today?
Ian Lustick
It’s not going to happen tomorrow. But we should call the bluff of those in Israel who say they want to keep the territories Israel occupied in 1967. When you look at the West Bank annexation bills in the Knesset, none of them talk about immediate annexation of all the people and territory. They are actually afraid of really annexing the territories. They prefer to maintain the fiction that they have not already been permanently absorbed.
Seth Ackerman
In the short term, the lobby seems to be hoping that after the elections in October there will be a new government — presumably led by Gadi Eisenkot — that presents a kinder, gentler face to the American public. Could that work?
Ian Lustick
Maybe. But it won’t last.
Remember who Gadi Eisenkot is. Compared to Netanyahu, he may look like a reasonable guy who’s focused on reality and not fantasy, and not on pandering to the worst prejudices of his audience. But he’s also the progenitor of the “Dahiya doctrine.” That’s the doctrine named after a neighborhood in Beirut that Israel completely destroyed, not just to kill combatants but to destroy all the civilian infrastructure around them.
What we saw in Gaza was the application of that doctrine. So let’s not think too ambitiously about what Eisenkot has to offer.
I think the most interesting question about the upcoming election is whether Eisenkot will even be able to form a government without aligning himself with Arab-majority parties. The Ra’am party will now have a Jewish member of its Knesset slate, so it won’t be a pure Arab party anymore, but it still won’t be a “Zionist party” as Israelis define it. And the way Netanyahu frames it, only traitors would form a government with the support of non-Zionist parties. (Though of course, he himself tried to do that in the past).
But looking at it in terms of geological time, what interests me is the precedent of Arab-Jewish cooperation — even right-wing cooperation with Arabs — that presages the possibility that at some point in the future, significant numbers of Jews will see advantages for themselves in West Bank and Gaza Palestinians being able to vote. Will we have an election outcome where no one can form a government unless the coalition includes Arabs? And how will the Israeli political system react to that?
To me, that’s more important than the question of how long Eisenkot will be able to keep putting lipstick on the pig. I’m more interested in whether this election will force the country to move toward Jewish-Arab political alliances.
Seth Ackerman
I asked earlier about Mearsheimer and Walt’s book. Twenty years ago, their book became a kind of literary scandal. Publications refused to publish their work, nasty reviews accused them of all kinds of terrible things. How would you compare the reaction you’ve gotten to your book so far?
Eli Clifton
It’s very different. We’re no longer in a world where you have to debate whether or not the lobby exists. When you look at the pushback against Steve and John, that’s unfortunately where they had to fight a lot of their battles: it was about whether the lobby exists at all, and whether saying it exists is somehow antisemitic. And that’s no longer the world we’re in. It’s pretty well established.
I mean, I have this website I maintain — israelslobby.com — which tracks Federal Election Comission records on pro-Israel Super PACs in real time. Right now I think they’ve raised $160 million in this political cycle. That probably means they’re going to have raised $250 million just for these midterms. A quarter of a billion dollars — that’s a lot of money for a special interest for a foreign country to raise and spend. So the lobby objectively exists. That’s not something we have to debate anymore.
It’s also in the headlines. We’ve been fortunate with the timing of the book, because this is very much a part of the public debate right now, particularly with the Gaza war, the Iran war, and the midterms. It’s a top-of-mind issue for voters in a way that foreign policy issues generally aren’t. Of course, that’s also the downside: a lot of people are talking about this now. So we’re trying to bring something new to the table, to contextualize how we got to this moment.
This isn’t just a current affairs book. It’s looking at the historical record of how Israel’s lobby became what it is today and what that has meant, in terms of lost diplomatic opportunities for the United States, in terms of lost resources, but also in terms of the measurable domestic price of crackdowns on civil liberties, antisemitism witch hunts, efforts to curtail speech, particularly at universities. In that respect, this is a scarier moment than 2007.

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Contributors

Eli Clifton is an investigative journalist and a cofounder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He is the coauthor, with Ian Lustick, of the 2026 book Israel’s Lobby.
Ian Lustick is an emeritus professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. An expert on the politics of the Middle East, he is the author of many books, including Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality and, most recently, Israel’s Lobby, coauthored with Eli Clifton.
Seth Ackerman is an editor at Jacobin.

https://jacobin.com/2026/09/israel-lobby-aipac-netanyahu-iran